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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The commercialisation of cocoa production in Ghana 
has a long history in Ghana dating back to the nineteenth 
century. The process of commercial development in 
cocoa is well documented and provides an alternative 
mode to contemporary models of commercialisation 
rooted in the adoption of modern technology and 
integration of farmers into markets. The historical 
development of cocoa was not dependent upon 
adoption of new technology, but the incorporation 
of a new crop into existing farming practices, and 
institutional innovations in land purchases and labour 
markets. Cocoa farmers took advantage of forested 
conditions in which cocoa thrive to gain windfall yields. 
This resulted in cocoa farmers continually moving to 
new forest frontiers where yields were heaviest and 
production cost less. In the old production districts 
cocoa became increasingly vulnerable to disease and 
pest epidemics, and mature plantations needed to 
be replanted. However, the costs of rehabilitating and 
replanting old plantations are much higher than those 
of clearing new frontiers, and yields are significantly 
lower. In old frontier areas farmers are faced with 
much larger weeding requirements and the need to 
use increasing quantities of agrochemicals to contain 
diseases and pests. The declining fertility of the soil 
also results in a marked decrease in yields in newly 
planted cocoa, resulting in the use of fertilisers. New 
hybrid cocoa varieties have been introduced to deal 
with these problems, and to provide high yields in drier 
conditions, but they depend upon the use of fertilisers 
and other inputs to perform well.
As long as uncultivated forestland exists, farmers 
prefer to move to the new frontier to cultivate cocoa 
rather than rehabilitate old plantations. This opening up 
of new frontiers results in surplus production of cocoa 
on world markets and the international price for cocoa 
adjusts accordingly to the lower costs of production in 
the new frontiers, undercutting the cost of production 
in older areas and intensifying the process of frontier 
colonisation. Historically this has resulted in global 
shifts in the production of cocoa from South America 
in the nineteenth century, to the Gold Coast in the early 
twentieth century and to the Côte D’Ivoire in the 1970s. 
By the late 1990s, as the forest frontier disappeared in 
Côte D’Ivoire new competition emerged from Indonesia, 
Brazil and Malaysia. However, by this period, tropical 
forests had become scarce and a focus of international 
environmental protection initiatives. During the 1990s, 
innovations by smallholder farmers in Côte d’Ivoire and 
Indonesia led to optimistic assessments of the future 
of new technologies in cocoa farming. However, these 
developments have floundered and smallholder cocoa 
farmers in Côte d’Ivoire and Indonesia are currently 
confronted by the same ecological crises, disease 
problems, social crises, and impoverishment faced by 
Ghanaian farmers.
This working paper critically analyses frameworks 
for agricultural commercialisation in cocoa through 
intensification based on the uptake of synthetic inputs 
and hybrid seeds, by placing agricultural development 
within a broader framework of the historical 
development of the frontier in Ghana, and the related 
problems of ecological and economic crises (related 
to cycles of boom and bust). The paper is based on 
two case studies carried out in Suhum and Ayensuano 
districts of the Eastern Region (one of the oldest 
growing cocoa areas in Ghana and which continues 
to produce cocoa) and the Juaboso district of the 
Western North Region (one of the frontiers opened up 
from the 1950s to 1970s, which is currently confronted 
with replanting old cocoa plantations). The study draws 
on a quantitative survey of 517 farmers and in-depth 
interviews and focus group discussions with farmers 
on their perceptions of change in cocoa. The study 
examines access to land, labour and technology, and 
how the complex interactions of scarcity of access 
to physical resources and labour influence farmers’ 
farming strategies and adoption of technology.
Land    
The opening up of new frontiers has been associated 
with the purchase of forestland by migrant farmers 
in Ghana. This does not lead to the development of 
long-term land markets, since in the early stages of 
cultivation labour is scarce, and land purchasers rely 
on family members to provide labour in exchange for 
granting them land rights. Purchased land becomes 
transformed into family land. The scramble for land in 
the new frontier areas rapidly leads to land scarcity. As 
the frontier becomes settled the dominant modes of 
land acquisition transform into family redistribution and 
sharecropping. As land scarcity intensifies, families 
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have insufficient land to redistribute, and in return for 
allocation family members are expected to redistribute 
some of their cocoa earnings to the lineage. This 
sometimes becomes formalised in sharecropping 
arrangements within families. Thus, land scarcity results 
in land becoming a significant cost, in which farmers 
can give 50 per cent of their production as ‘rent’ to gain 
access to land.  Since a very small proportion of land 
is currently acquired through direct land sales, land 
reforms based on strengthening individual property 
rights do little to address issues of access to land for 
the majority of cocoa smallholder farmers. 
Labour
The high cost of access to land and lack of access 
to family land for many results in scarcity of labour. 
Extended families are unable to draw upon family labour 
to the extent they did in the past; they increasingly 
have to look outside of family land for their livelihoods. 
Farmers are also resorting more and more to hired 
labour. However, this labour becomes highly expensive 
for replanting old cocoa farms. Much of the migrant 
labour available during the pioneer frontier phase in 
Ghana have long since relocated to the frontier areas in 
Côte D’Ivoire, resulting in scarce and expensive labour 
in Ghana. Farmers may be forced to give out their lands 
to other farmers through sharecropping due to the high 
labour costs. High labour costs are also reflected in the 
emergence of credit labour relations.
Technology
As a result of the relative costs of gaining access to land 
and labour many farmers struggle to afford investing 
in hybrid seeds, fertilisers and agrochemicals. While 
women have less access to modern technologies 
than men, the vast majority of men have difficulty 
implementing the recommended cultural practices and 
achieving noticeable improvements in yields. Lack of 
capital forces many farmers to make choices between 
purchasing fertilisers and agrochemicals. In a bid to 
encourage farmers to take up new technology, cocoa 
services often provide free technology packages 
to farmers. This results in the widespread use and 
adoption of elements of modern technologies. However, 
most farmers are unable to consistently purchase 
these inputs. This may have negative consequences, 
for example, farmers may use hybrids and clear more 
trees to accommodate hybrid varieties but are unable 
to follow the recommended fertiliser doses, resulting 
in lower yields, high disease infestations, and more 
deforestation. The recommended cultural practices 
often do not reflect the capital available to farmers, the 
low prices of cocoa on international markets and do 
not translate into higher yields. 
Policy recommendations
The dominant policies focus on promoting the 
intensification of cocoa production by smallholders 
through the use of modern technologies. The 
objectives are to encourage higher yields and 
discourage deforestation through movement into new 
forests. This does not reflect the actual conditions of 
production, in which new forest frontiers no longer 
exist outside of forest reserves. Most cocoa farmers 
are confronted with the crop’s high vulnerability to 
disease and the need to increasingly apply costly 
inputs to remain productive. The problems of the 
environmental rehabilitation of existing cocoa farms 
also need to be addressed.
One potential solution for smallholders is to focus 
on creating more varied agroforestry systems, that 
provide alternative options for farmers, or combine a 
range of forest and fruit tree species to create a more 
diverse income source for farmers.  These should 
seek to minimise reliance on the use of agrochemicals 
and promote a more ecologically conserving and 
restorative farming system that requires less capital 
investments and creates a range of viable agricultural 
and forest commodities, enabling farmers to better 
deal with fluctuating market prices and boom and bust 
cycles. There is a need to create a range of solutions, 
and incremental pathways to a more environmentally 
friendly and productive farming system that meets 
the needs of farmers with lack of capital, but who 
regard cocoa as a viable crop for providing them 
with a livelihood under particular conditions.  More 
research is needed on the actual conditions under 
which farmers grow cocoa rather than the potential 
to achieve exceptional yields with large investments 
under highly favourable conditions.  At present, 
environmental approaches have been developed 
which seek to accommodate shade tree planting with 
a continued focus on achieving higher yields of cocoa 
through promoting increasing use of inputs and hybrid 
seeds. However, this approach is not addressing the 
current crisis of high costs of inputs and drastically 
falling international prices for cocoa that farmers have 
faced in recent years.
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Cocoa production in Ghana has a long history dating 
back to the nineteenth century, before colonial rule. 
It built upon commercial oil palm exports in the early 
nineteenth century. By the 1860s, farmers began looking 
for alternative crops to oil palm due to competition from 
southeast Asia and declining prices, and by the 1920s, 
the Gold Coast had emerged as the dominant cocoa 
producer in the world, providing 80 per cent of global 
supplies. This long history of commercial development 
in Ghanaian cocoa adds three important dimensions to 
contemporary framings of agrarian commercialisation in 
Africa. Firstly, the initial commercialisation of cocoa was 
carried out with little external technological innovation; 
it was a product of the agro-ecological knowledge of 
farmers, endogenous institutions used to organise 
labour and land markets, and the colonisation of a 
forest frontier. The technological transformations were 
simple, and agrarian commercialisation was based on 
social and economic developments rather than the 
adoption of new technology, opening up increased 
productivity and rising standards of living. This 
contrasts with the paradigms of contemporary models 
of technology-driven agrarian modernisation. Secondly 
the development of commercialisation in cocoa has 
risen within the contexts of economic cycles of boom 
and bust, surplus global production driving down 
prices in particular epochs, and rising prices leading to 
the opening of production in new regions of the world, 
leading to regional shifts in production. The opening of 
new markets has not only led to economic opportunities 
and rising standards of living but also to decline in older 
frontier areas and economic stagnation. This suggests a 
complex long-term relationship between integration into 
markets and economic opportunity. Thirdly, ecological 
factors have been extremely important in shifts in 
production as the original forest conditions in which 
cocoa thrive decline, and as the cultivation of a cocoa 
monoculture leads to disease and pest epidemics. With 
the decline of the original forest conditions, the cost of 
cocoa production rose considerably, leading to a shift 
to new forest frontiers areas and the decline of old 
centres of production. 
Historically, cocoa production has shifted from the 
Caribbean and Brazil to Fernando Po, to the Gold 
Coast in the 1920s, and to Côte d’Ivoire in the 1970s. 
By the 1990s, new production centres emerged in 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Brazil as the rapid colonisation 
of new frontier land in Côte d’Ivoire came to an end. 
But as world cocoa prices declined during the 1990s, 
production in these new areas retreated, and even the 
most promising new production centre in Sulawesi, 
suffered from the averse effects of price slumps and 
disease outbreaks related to ecological stress (Clough, 
Faust, and Tscharntke, 2009).  Since the late 1990s, 
with the decline of new forest frontiers globally and 
the rise of environmental concerns with protecting 
remaining forests from agricultural encroachment, 
the major focus in the cocoa industry has been on 
promoting intensive cultivation in old plantations areas 
rather than in uncultivated forests. The use of hybrid 
varieties, agrochemicals and synthetic fertilisers has 
resulted in increasing production costs, which has 
not been reflected in the international price for cocoa. 
Consequently, a declining proportion of total value of 
cocoa enters farmers’ pockets, resulting in increasing 
poverty for a significant number of cocoa farmers in 
Ghana. With few viable alternatives to cocoa, Côte 
d’Ivoire and Ghana continue to account for over 70 per 
cent of global production, although yields are often low.
Ruf (2010: 4) has characterised this process of frontier 
development and cycles of boom and bust as based 
on ‘forest rent’. He argues that in the early years of 
settlement in new pioneer frontier areas, farmers are 
able to acquire cheap land (since the area is largely 
unsettled) and the forest conditions of the land 
provide large cocoa yields without large inputs of 
labour in weeding or the need to use fertilisers and 
agrochemicals. Subsequently, as cocoa matures 
and soil fertilities decline, the successful renovation 
of cocoa plantations requires high expenditures on 
inputs and labour. However, replanted cocoa usually 
fails to achieve the high yields initially gained in new 
forest frontiers. This disparity is heightened by the 
continued existence of new frontier land: as long as 
this exists farmers prefer to acquire lands in new areas 
rather than renovate existing plantations. The existence 
of the frontier enables farmers to meet the demands of 
the world market cheaply and as a result, international 
market prices do not reflect the cost of production in 
old areas. This leads to a shift of production and the 
exit of old cocoa frontiers. During the late 1990s, as the 
frontier reached its limits in Côte d’Ivoire, production 
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began to shift from the larger Baoule farmers to small 
migrant planters from Burkina Faso, who intensively 
cultivated smaller areas of cocoa often on the smallest 
of margins. Similar developments of more intensive 
cocoa plantations in the Sulawesi in Indonesia has 
prompted Ruf (2010) to develop a theory of a transition 
to a more technologically focused system of intensive 
smallholder production, providing a pathway out of 
poverty. A second option noted by Ruf and Schroth 
(2015) is the movement to diversify production 
into other crops, or towards agroforestry systems 
incorporating a diversity of tree crops in response to 
both the vulnerability of tree crop monocultures to 
disease and pests and the economic shocks caused 
by price fluctuations of cocoa on the world market.
There has been considerable research conducted in 
devising more intensive input-based systems, resulting 
in the potential for higher yields among West African 
cocoa smallholder farmers cultivating secondary 
bush. However, the uptake of these technologies 
among farmers has been very mixed, and most 
studies on adoption of inputs among cocoa farmers 
in both Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire show disappointing 
rates of uptake of fertilisers, agrochemicals and hybrid 
varieties by farmers. Consequently, since the early 
2000s, the Ghanaian government has played a major 
role in introducing free hybrid seedlings, subsidies on 
synthetic fertilisers, and free agrochemical spraying 
campaigns. Odijie (2018) argues that the provision of 
subsidised inputs to farmers represents a desperate 
attempt by government to keep farmers in cocoa 
production, when an increasing number of them 
are abandoning cocoa for other crops that require 
less expenditure on inputs, such as rubber and oil 
palm. He argues that very little of the value of cocoa 
currently trickles down to cocoa farmers and that the 
government ends up spending most of the revenues 
it gains from taxes on assisting the cocoa sector. He 
sees the government as essentially subsidising the 
transnational cocoa corporations that absorb most 
of the value produced in cocoa. This is substantiated 
by data collected in the Côte d’Ivoire by Fountain 
and Huertz-Adams (2015). They estimate that cocoa 
farmers only receive about 6 per cent of the total value 
of cocoa. They also point to structural poverty within 
the cocoa sector and estimate that over 60 per cent 
of cocoa farmers in Côte d’Ivoire are impoverished. 
Fairtrade International (2018) has also estimated that 
only 12 per cent of Côte d’Ivoire cocoa farmers receive 
a living income of over US$2.50 per day. Low producer 
cocoa prices also led to tensions within the cocoa 
industry in 2019, when the governments of both Côte 
d’Ivoire and Ghana threatened to boycott the sale of 
cocoa unless international buyers raised minimum 
prices. They eventually settled on implementing a Living 
Income Differential, in which the governments would 
pay farmers the equivalent of US$400 when prices fell 
below US$2,600 per t (Africa Research Bulletin, 2019).
Nevertheless, the plight of cocoa farmers is not unique, 
and most staple crops produced for international 
markets are subject to price volatility, cycles of boom 
and bust, declining returns of proportion of value to 
farmers, and the ecological consequences of large-
scale monocrop production (Daviron and Ponte, 
2005). In contrast with many other industrial tree 
crops, the ability of cocoa to thrive in forest shade 
enables it to adapt remarkably well to agroforestry 
systems in which a variety of trees are cultivated and 
preserved (Schroth and Harvey, 2007; Laird, Awung 
and Lysinge, 2007). However, in the quest to maximise 
yields, modern cocoa hybrids have been bred to be 
less tolerant of shade than the older varieties. The 
viability of developing cocoa agroforestry systems 
that preserve many forest elements and other fruiting 
trees alongside cocoa and which minimise the use of 
chemical inputs (which often have a harmful effect on 
the forest fauna), needs to be explored as a serious 
option that can meet the needs of smallholder cocoa 
farmers, while addressing environmental and climate 
change policy frameworks. 
Contemporary policy concerns with deforestation 
and climate change have resulted in a growing body 
of research examining the viability of cocoa as a 
component of diverse agroforestry systems (Gockowski 
and Sonwa, 2011; Asare et al., 2014; Gyau et al., 
2015; Asare and Anders, 2016). These studies can be 
divided into those that seek to incorporate more shade 
trees  into existing intensive cultivation of cocoa, with 
high use of fertilisers and agrochemicals (Gockowski 
and Sonwa, 2011), and those which seek to create 
more diverse agroforestry systems that incorporate a 
diversity of income generating crops and rely less on 
agrochemicals, creating a more friendly agroecology 
for bird and insect populations (Schroth and Harvey, 
2007; Gyau et al. 2015; Asigbaase et al., 2019).
This paper examines debates about the 
commodification of cocoa production, changing values 
of relative factors of production, ecological crises, and 
shifts in frontiers in the light of a comparative case 
study of two cocoa producing areas in Ghana: the 
Suhum-Ayensuano area and Juaboso. The Suhum-
Ayensuano area is one of the oldest cocoa growing 
frontiers of cocoa on the fringes of the southeastern 
forests of Ghana. Juaboso, which is near the border 
of Côte d’Ivoire, is one of the new frontier areas to 
develop in western Ghana from the 1950s to the 1970s. 
Following an outline of the development of the cocoa 
frontier in Ghana and its ecological consequences, 
this study compares access to land, labour and 
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technology in the two study areas. It examines the 
interaction of the commodification of land and labour 
with the role of extended families in agricultural 
production, and the transformations in the factors and 
relations of production that are related to the nature 
of frontier development and its subsequent decline. 
It also examines processes of social differentiation; 
the extent to which new technologies are taken up by 
farmers; and the extent to which technology shapes 
the emergence of new forms of agrarian accumulation 
or fails to address the underlying problems that 
have emerged within the cocoa industry. These 
problems include declining agroecological conditions, 
deforestation, increasing vulnerability of monocrop 
production to disease and pests, and declining returns 
to farming as more capital is expended in labour, 
seeds, inputs, and fertilisers. 
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This study is based upon a combination of quantitative 
and qualitative research methods carried out in ten 
settlements in the Suhum and Ayensuano municipal 
districts (which formerly constituted the Kraboa 
Coaltar district and will be referred to as Suhum-
Ayensuano) of the Eastern Region and the Juaboso 
district in the recently created Western North Region 
(originally Western Region). Quantitative data are used 
to provide insights into the prevalence of particular 
types of relations and normative practices found in 
the qualitative work, and to explore the relationship 
between different sets of factors. Beyond this, the study 
also builds upon historical dimensions from secondary 
works, examining the changes and transformation 
within institutions and practices in the context of 
changing patterns of frontier expansion.
Focus groups discussions and in-depth interviews 
were used to gain qualitative data. In the Ayensuano 
and Suhum districts following initial focus group 
discussions, in-depth interviews were held with thirty 
farmers (including seven women and 23 men) in the 
settlements of Bekoekrom in Ayensuano and Ayisaa 
and Brong Densuso (a neighbouring settlement) in the 
Suhum district. An interaction was also held with the 
Cocoa Services Division at Suhum. In Juaboso, nine 
focus group discussions and 61 in-depth interviews 
were held with 56 farmers and five labourers, and 13 
life histories were captured with older cocoa farmers 
at Juaboso Nkwanta, Abrokofe, and Antobia. Seven 
interviews were also held with Cocoa Health and 
Extension Division Officers and purchasing clerks. 
Twenty-four farmers interviewed were female; all 
labourers and loading boys were male; one out of 
five purchasing clerks was female; and both Cocoa 
Health and Extension Division Officers were male. 
Five out of the 13 life histories were of female farmers. 
The communities were dominated by Sefwi indigenes 
with fewer migrants, although there were many inter-
marriages between Akan and Sefwi groups. All 
labourers interviewed were migrants from the north, 
Volta and Krobo areas. Based on preliminary insights 
from the qualitative research, a structured questionnaire 
was designed and used to collect data from 517 
farmers selected from 10 farming communities. This 
included the settlements of Bekoekrom, Ayisaa, 
Brong Densuso, Sowartey, Duodokrom and Esiam in 
Suhum-Ayensuano, and Juaboso Nkwanta, Abrokofe, 
Antobia, Aferewaa and Boizan in Juaboso. A total of 
241 people were interviewed at Suhum-Ayensuano, 
including 161 men and 77 women. In Juaboso 276 
people were interviewed, including 172 men and 77 
women. Women made up 35 per cent of the sample.
The quantitative questionnaire sought to obtain 
information from farmers on temporal changes in 
land tenure and labour arrangements, use of inputs, 
output of cocoa, profitability of cocoa farming, and 
government policies. The sample size in each of the 
10 communities was proportional to the community’s 
total population. In each farming community, the 
estimated total number of the houses was divided 
by the pre-determined sample size to obtain the 
sampling interval that was used to select the houses 
that participated in the study. Generally, one farmer 
was interviewed in a selected house, although in a 
few instances where more than one farmer was 
interviewed these were selected on the basis of 
gender and age representation. STATA was used to 
analyse the quantitative data.  
2 RESEARCH METHODS
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Figure 2.1 Map of research sites 
Source: © Ghana Statistical Services, adapted by authors.
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Figure 2.2: The cocoa frontier in Ghana 
Source: © Ghana Statistical Services, adapted by authors.
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The origins of commercial export crop production 
in Ghana can be traced to oil palm production in 
southeastern Ghana in the early nineteenth century 
in the Krobo and Akuapem areas. Palm oil was 
exported to Europe from the 1820s. This was based 
on the establishment of large plantations by wealthy 
traders and chiefs, some of whom purchased land 
from neighbouring peoples within the area, giving rise 
to land sales that date back to the early nineteenth 
century (Hill, 1963; Johnson, 1964; Amanor, 2010). 
These large plantations were cultivated with extended 
family and domestic slave labour (Johnson, 1964; 
Amanor, 1994; Austin, 2005). Traders also accumulated 
capital in the kola nut trade and wild rubber tapping 
– capital which was also invested in the development 
of cocoa (Hill, 1963; Arhin, 1980). During the 1860s 
declining international prices for palm oil, resulting from 
southeast Asian entry into export production, led Gold 
Coast producers to shift to cocoa, which emerged 
as the most profitable export crop. Since cocoa 
prefers wetter forest conditions and land markets had 
emerged to purchase land for oil palm during the early 
nineteenth century, many aspiring cocoa farmers in 
Akuapem were able to purchase land in more forested 
areas within Akyem, in the present Suhum-Ayensuano 
area (Hill, 1963). These farmers moved into areas 
where there was little agricultural accumulation of 
capital, and where chiefs were willing to transact land 
with migrants, setting off a process of pioneer frontier 
cultivation of cocoa.
According to Hill (1963), two significant social 
institutions developed for the purchase of land. Among 
the richest planters from Akuapem towns, a small 
group of associates purchased large tracts of land, 
which they parcelled out to matrilineal relatives who 
helped them to convert and settle the forest, and who 
provided essential labour services for them. In other 
areas, where there was less capital accumulation 
within lineages, prospective cocoa farmers formed 
land-purchasing companies, which would raise capital 
among the members to buy large tracts of land from 
chiefs. The land was subsequently shared among the 
group according to financial contribution (Hill, 1963). As 
the value of cocoa became recognised, its cultivation 
1 This history is presented in more detail in Amanor, Yaro and Teye (2020).
spread among indigenous smallholders in the Akyem 
area on their family land (Beckett, 1944; Okali and 
Kotey, 1971; Okali, 1983).1 
The expansion of cocoa also attracted migrant labour 
to the main cocoa growing areas. This included a 
significant number of migrants from areas designated 
by colonial authorities as labour reserves in northern 
Ghana and the surrounding Sahelian French colonies 
in which males were forced to migrate to gain 
employment to meet tax obligations (Amanor, 1994). 
The cocoa sector was regarded as one of the most 
favourable sectors to work in. This availability of labour 
enabled enterprising cocoa farmers to expand their 
production into new areas. Old established plantations 
were often placed under migrant sharecrop labourers, 
who were remunerated with a third share of the yield, 
while family labour and monetised labour was recruited 
to work in creating plantations in new frontier areas. 
Enterprising farmers sought to minimise cash outlays 
so that they could invest savings in the purchase of 
new land.
The combination of family and sharecrop labour 
enabled the rapid colonisation and expansion into 
new forest frontiers by capital accumulating farmers. 
By the 1920s, cocoa was widely cultivated in Ashanti 
by large numbers of Asante large-scale farmers and 
smallholders, who had sufficient capital to hire migrants 
(Austin, 2005). In contrast, in the Western Region, 
which had much lower rates of capital accumulation 
and lacked locally available labour, the expansion of 
cocoa had to await the arrival of migrants with capital 
(Boni, 2005).
The opening up of new frontiers of cocoa production by 
migrant farmers facilitated the uptake by locals and by 
smallholders. The demands of migrant farmers for paid 
and sharecrop labour opened up labour migrations, 
providing opportunities for local farmers to hire labour 
to convert forest into cocoa. Local landlords and 
chiefs released land to migrants to convert into cocoa 
production on share contracts. In these contracts, the 
resulting cocoa plantation would be shared between 
landlords and tenants, with tenants claiming their 
share as their own property which could be inherited 
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by their children. The movement of local smallholders 
into cocoa farming on family land also led to the rapid 
expansion of family land and growing land shortages 
in the frontier areas, encouraging migrations to newer 
frontiers. 
By the 1940s, a significant percentage of cocoa 
plantations in the Eastern Region (or Eastern Province 
of the Gold Coast) had matured and become 
increasingly vulnerable to disease, particularly swollen 
shoot (a plant pathogenic virus of the Caulimoviridae 
family which leads to declining yields and kills cocoa 
trees within a few years), which developed into a 
serious epidemic (Hill, 1963).  Given the costs of 
replanting cocoa, many farmers shifted their efforts 
into the Western Region during the 1950s, and migrant 
labour began to relocate to this area. This led to an 
increasing shortage of labour in the Eastern Region. 
Many impoverished farmers also migrated to the west, 
where they worked as wage labourers or sharecrop 
labourers (Arhin, 1988).
By the 1970s, cocoa in the Western Region had to 
compete with the opening up of new cocoa frontiers 
in southwest Côte d’Ivoire. The rapid expansion of 
Ivoirian cocoa resulted in an oversupply in international 
markets and rapidly declining prices. More favourable 
production conditions (including access to ownership 
of land at cheap prices) in the new frontier areas of 
Côte d’Ivoire (Chauveau and Léonard, 1996) resulted 
in most of the Sahelian migrant labour force relocating 
from Ghana to the Côte d’Ivoire. This led to labour 
shortages in Ghana and increasingly expensive labour. 
Farmers needed to resort more to daily casual labour 
rather than annual contracts and abusa caretakers – 
hired labourers or farm managers who receive a third 
of the proceeds of the cocoa when it is harvested and 
marketed at the end of the farming year.2 By the late 
1990s, the rapid expansion of Ivoirian cocoa resulted 
in the disappearance of new forest frontiers and both 
Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire  were now faced with the task 
of maintaining cocoa production through replanting 
old plantations in secondary forest bush. This involved 
a transition to new technologies, including hybrid 
seedlings adapted to drier conditions, use of fertilisers 
on which the hybrids were dependent, and the regular 
use of agro-chemicals against diseases and pests. 
2 Abusa denotes a third share (literally ‘divided into three’) and abunu, a half share (‘divided into two’).  
 This is applied to both land renting and hiring of labour. In the labour system the caretaker receives   
 a third share of the harvest for maintaining, weeding, harvesting an established cocoa farm.   
 There are several variants of the tenancy system, in which the tenant may receive a half share   
 or a two-thirds share. In the past, where the tenant created a cocoa plantation from forest    
 and managed the farm, they received two thirds of the harvest. In another variation, the plantation   
 created by the tenant was divided between tenant and landlord and the landlords were responsible for  
 managing their portion. In this arrangement, the tenant received one third of the land. In recent times,  
 the dominant sharecrop tenancy arrangement is a half share between tenant and  landlord (Hill, 1956;  
 Amanor, 2010).
The uptake of new technologies has been slow and 
problematic. The increasing cost of gaining access to 
land and labour has left farmers with few resources to 
invest in inputs. Although it has been demonstrated that 
farmers can achieve much higher yields through these 
investments, these have not necessarily translated into 
practice due to the particular production conditions on 
farmers’ fields and the risks they face.
The increasing shortage of land in Ghana has also 
transformed family labour in cocoa production. 
An increasing number of farmers are faced with 
the prospects of acquiring land outside of the 
extended family lands. Since the 1970s, studies have 
documented the increasing conflicts between family 
members over access to cocoa plantations (Okali, 
1983; Amanor, 2010). Insecurity and contestations 
around access to family land have resulted in growing 
numbers of farmers seeking land outside the lineage 
on sharecropping terms, or in families releasing land 
to kin under sharecropping arrangements, since they 
gain preferential access. The decline of family land 
has also led to the transformation of family labour, 
as those without land or security in land seek land 
elsewhere, turn to wage labouring, or move into other 
occupations.  This results in increasing expenditure 
on labour by farmers who can no longer rely on family 
labour. The higher labour requirements and costs 
involved in rehabilitating plantations often absorb 
significant capital. This prevents the majority of farmers 
from investing in new hybrid varieties and inputs, 
particularly since increasing investment in inputs is 
not reflected in increases in international prices. Thus, 
the trend for an increasing number of farmers is one 
of struggling to continue to produce on small margins, 
rather than a discernible process of upgrading farm 
production. This is because in many areas there are 
few attractive alternative livelihood options to cocoa 
farming available.
The following sections draw upon field data from the 
Suhum-Ayensuano and Juaboso areas to examine the 
main emerging trends in access to land, labour and 
technology and the allocation of resources in cocoa 
farming. This is examined in relation to the comparative 
historical development of the frontier in both areas, and 
the commodification of land, labour and technology.
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The dynamics in the development of frontiers have led 
to different patterns of landholding in the Juaboso and 
Suhum-Ayensuano districts. The Suhum-Ayensuano 
area is part of a much older frontier, dating to the late 
nineteenth century, which has seen an early rapid 
expansion of cocoa followed by an ecological crisis 
emanating out of the swollen shoot epidemic in cocoa 
in the 1950s. This has resulted in the outmigration of 
the wealthier cocoa farmers to newer frontier districts 
and declining yields for cocoa. The relative age of 
cocoa farms in this area has resulted in large numbers 
of farmers with claims and interests in lineage land, 
which is well beyond that which the land can cater 
for. The low productivity of cocoa in this area, in 
comparison to new frontier areas, has resulted in many 
descendants of wealthy farmers shifting out of cocoa 
into other occupations. These factors result in a highly 
mobile farming population, a prevalence of small plots, 
and high incidences of sharecropping. In contrast, 
in Juaboso, the phase of senescence of cocoa and 
replanting is a contemporary experience. The much 
later emergence of cocoa has resulted in lower land 
pressures than in the Suhum-Ayensuano area and in 
more farmers accessing land through inheritance and 
family relations.  
These differences are reflected in the size of farm 
holdings in the two districts. In the quantitative survey 
only 35 per cent of farmers in Suhum-Ayensuano 
had landholdings of 2.5ha or more, compared to 
65 per cent of farmers at Juaboso. Forty-two per 
cent of farmers surveyed at Juaboso have holdings 
of over 4ha compared to 13 per cent of farmers in 
Suhum-Ayensuano.
These pressures on land within Suhum-Ayensuano 
have also significantly impacted on women’s access 
to land. Thirty-five per cent of women possessed less 
than 1ha of land compared to 13 per cent of males, 
while at Juaboso 10 per cent of women had less 
than 1ha of land compared to 4 per cent of men. At 
Juaboso, 27 per cent of women had plots of land 
between 4–8ha compared to 4 per cent of women 
in Suhum-Ayensuano. This suggests that as land 
becomes scarce, less is distributed to women.
There is also significant inequality in the distribution 
of land plots by age at Juaboso, where 65 per cent of 
farmers within the over 65 age group and 41 per cent of 
farmers within the 50–64 age groups possessed lands 
over 4ha, as compared to 13 per cent of farmers under 
30. In contrast, at Suhum-Ayensuano the vast majority 
of farmers in all age categories farmed less than 2.5ha of 
land. Only a few farmers belonging to large landowning 
families had access to large plots of land.
4.1 Land purchases and ownership
Patterns of land ownership in the cocoa sector are 
closely related to the process of frontier development. 
Migrant farmers move into unsettled forest areas 
after acquiring tracts of land from chiefs, in areas in 
which there was previously little commodification of 
land or development of commercial agriculture. This 
process of frontier development has resulted in a 
rapid transformation of land into individual purchased 
property. This has largely occurred in forested areas in 
which there had been little development of settlements 
and infrastructure. The early migrants colonising these 








Under 1ha 20.3 5.8 12.6 65
1–2.4ha 44.8 30.4 37.1 192
2.5–4ha 21.6 22.1 21.9 113
4.1–8ha 11.2 31.5 22.1 114
Over 8ha 2.1 10.2 6.3 33
Total 241 276 517 517
Source: Authors’ own
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areas needed to develop social support networks to 
create the basic infrastructure for new settlements 
and for clearing unsettled forest. The migrant farmers 
formed companies in their hometowns for the joint 
purchase and settlement of land or drew upon large 
extended lineage networks to settle the area, as in the 
matrilineal lands described by (Hill, 1963) in south-east 
Ghana. As cocoa farming spread and was taken up by 
the indigenous smallholder farmers, the areas of local 
lineage lands expanded, diminishing the areas available 
for migrant purchases, and leading to the foreclosure 
of the frontier, and then its expansion into other areas. 
Land purchases are characteristic of a particular phase 
of the opening up of frontiers; they eventually become 
less significant as a means of gaining access to land 
as migrants subsequently redistribute land to their kin, 
and as local smallholders move into the cultivation of 
cocoa on their own lineage lands.3
Due to the mobilisation of lineage or family labour 
in transforming forest into cocoa plantations, and 
because of the large demand for land, the early land 
transactions did not lead to the growth of permanent 
land markets or the perpetuation of land sales. As 
the areas of uncultivated forests were brought under 
cultivation, land sales were increasingly replaced with 
the family redistribution of land through inheritance and 
gifts of land, and through the rise of sharecropping. 
Portions of the purchased land were distributed to 
wives and children and other relatives willing to work 
on cocoa cultivation, with the understanding that they 
would be allocated parts of the land in the future as 
their own cocoa plantations (Hill, 1963; Okali, 1983). 
The few land transactions that continue to occur are 
usually distress sales to meet exceptional expenditures 
and difficulties.
The increasing scarcity of land as the frontiers mature 
results in an unwillingness of those who have purchased 
land to sell surplus land on the market according to 
3 Locals can also gain land by clearing unclaimed forestland and cultivating it. Subsequently, through   
 inheritance, it is transformed into family land.
their farming needs, since replacement costs in the 
future are likely to be much higher. Thus, land sales 
do not tend to operate as a means of distributing land 
from land-surplus to land-scarce farmers, as it has 
been theorised in the literature on the development 
of land markets (Deininger, 2003). Land sales have 
usually operated as a means of enabling uncultivated 
land in frontier areas to be brought under cultivation in 
areas where the capital and labour requirements were 
originally lacking, and to kick-start a process of export 
crop production. Since agricultural labour tended to 
be scarce in new frontier areas, the early generation 
of cocoa farmers that opened up new frontiers 
usually relied on family labour. Family members 
acquired interests and rights in the land through their 
contribution to the creation of the cocoa plantations 
on which they worked. The large number of family 
members who came to develop interests and claims 
of the cocoa property created difficulties for future 
land sales. Many of the early land purchasers also 
relied on capital that had been accumulated in their 
families, or joined together with other family members 
to purchase land, which also resulted in their lineages 
having interests and claims to a stake in the land. 
Since inheritance rules are not based on primogeniture 
(inheritance by one predetermined heir) individually 
purchased property tends to be transformed back into 
family property as it becomes shared among various 
extended family members with claims upon the land 
(Hill, 1963; Okali, 1983; Amanor, 2010).
A large number of migrants were attracted to the new 
cocoa frontiers in which they hoped to make a better 
living. This included many labourers and aspiring 
farmers with insufficient capital to invest in land. With 
the emergence of a significant labour force within 
the area, the landowning chiefs and elders began to 
allocate land on sharecrop arrangements to aspiring 
cocoa farmers. This often involved dividing the farm 
into shares between the tenant and landlord in which 
Table 4.2. Male and female land ownership land in Suhum-Ayensuano and Juaboso
Hectares Suhum-Ayensuano Juaboso Total
Hectares Male (%) Female (%) Male (%) Female (%) No. of farmers
Under 1ha 13.4 35.1 3.5 9.6 65
1–2.4ha 45.7 42.9 26.2 37.5 192
2.5–4ha 23.8 16.9 21.5 23.1 113
4.1–8ha 14.6 3.9 34.3 26.9 114
over 8ha 2.5 1.3 14.5 2.9 33
No. of farmers 164 77 172 104 517
Source: Authors’ own
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the tenant’s share became recognised as their own 
property. A common arrangement in the Eastern 
Region in the colonial period was for the landlord 
to gain two thirds of the plantation and the tenant 
one third (Hill, 1956). In contrast, where the tenants 
continued to manage and farm the cocoa plantation 
they had created, they would receive two thirds of the 
cocoa yields, but the land continued to be recognised 
as the landlord’s property. This enabled landowners 
to convert land ownership into cocoa plantation 
ownership. For landless migrants without sufficient 
capital to purchase land, sharecropping provided an 
avenue to gaining access to it. In the Western Region 
from the 1960s and 1970s, the dominant land sharing 
arrangement was a half share between landlord and 
tenant (Boni, 2005).
The lack of continuous development in land markets 
is reflected in the nature of access to farm plots 
reported by farmers in the quantitative survey. Only 
5 per cent of the current cocoa plantations were 
acquired through direct purchase.4 The dominant 
means of gaining access to land was through family 
allocation of land, which accounted for 68 per cent of 
the cocoa plantations, and through sharecropping, 
which accounted for 21 per cent of cocoa farm plots. 
There were significant differences in the proportions 
of farmers gaining access to land through family 
allocation and through sharecropping within the two 
4 The data focuses on plantations rather than farmers because farmers may own multiple cocoa farms  
 acquired under different arrangements.
areas. In Suhum-Ayensuano 52 per cent of cocoa 
farms were gained through family allocations and 42 
per cent through sharecropping; at Juaboso 80 per 
cent of cocoa farms were acquired through family 
redistribution and only 5 per cent through sharecrop 
arrangements (see Table 4.3). However, family land may 
also be given out to family members on a sharecrop 
arrangement. Ten per cent of cocoa plantations under 
family land in Suhum-Ayensuano were granted under 
sharecropping arrangements, compared to 4 per cent 
in Juaboso. The higher frequency of sharecropping 
arrangements on family land at Suhum-Ayensuano 
reflects the scarcity of land.
4.2 Women’s access to land and land 
scarcity
Women’s access to land varies according to patterns 
of development in the cocoa frontier. These patterns 
of development include  areas in which land was 
acquired by relatively well-to-do migrants and areas in 
which smallholder farmers moved into cocoa once the 
initial infrastructure was set up, including when labour 
became available and a marketing structure was put 
in place by the early large-scale farmers (Hill, 1963). 
Women were largely absent among the initial Akuapem 
farmers who acquired large portions of land in the 
Akyem forests, although some were allocated plots 
of land by their land-acquiring relatives (Hill, 1963). 
Table 4.3. Nature of access to land on cocoa plantations
Source of land Suhum-Ayensuano
(% of farm plots)
Juaboso 
(% of farm plots)
Total 
(% of farm plots)
No. of farm plots
Family land 52.4 79.8 68.0 669
Purchased 4.7 5.5 5.2 51
Sharecrop 42.2 5.0 21.0 207
Other 0.7 9.6 5.8 57
No. of farm plots 424 560 984 984
Source: Authors’ own
Table 4.4. Nature of access to family land
Source of land Suhum-Ayensuano
(% of farm plots)
Juaboso 
(% of farm plots)
Total 
(% of farm plots)
No. of farm plots
Inherited 82.8 64.2 70.3 470
Gift 6.8 33.1 24.4 163
Sharecrop 10.0 1.6 4.3 29
Other 0.5 1.1 0.7 6
No. of farm plots 221 447 668 668
Source: Authors’ own
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Similarly, women were largely absent from the land-
purchasing companies in which farmers contributed 
to the purchase of large plots of land that were 
subsequently divided among contributing members. 
However, before the advent of cocoa farming, women 
played an important role in forest agriculture and 
men often cleared tracts of land that they allocated to 
women to farm. In the 1940s, Field (1948) records that 
in Akyem, fathers would clear land and allocated it to 
their daughters to farm.  In the late 1950s, Hill (1963) 
recorded the significant participation of women in 
cocoa farming in Akyem villages (in which land was 
held by lineages and acquired through clearing forest). 
Hill and McGlade (1957) also reported the difficulties 
women experienced in gaining land as cocoa farming 
expanded, and the attempts of women to protect 
women’s access to land by redefining it as women’s 
property that passes from mother to daughters. 
Amanor (2000) found daughters fiercely defending 
their rights to their mothers’ land from sons who were 
experiencing difficulty in gaining land access through 
their fathers and maternal uncle and who were turning 
towards their mothers for land.  The daughters argued 
that if their mother acceded to her sons’ requests the 
land would eventually pass to the sons’ sons, who 
were not event members of the matrilineage or their 
nephews. In the early 1980s, Okali (1983) reported 
increasing conflicts between husbands and wives 
and their children over the inheritance of cocoa farms. 
The wives and children expected to be compensated 
with cocoa farms for the labour they had exerted in 
managing the farm, while the matrilineal relatives of the 
husband sought to exclude his wife and children since 
they were not part of the matrilineage. These conflicts 
over land reflected the increasing scarcity of land, and 
its adverse impact on women’s and youth’s access to 
land.  The existing rights women have gained in land 
may become contested with growing scarcity of land, 
which results in competition between existing rights 
holders and more exclusive access to land.
One of the problems that arises from focusing on 
commercialisation within a specific sector, is that it 
does not contextualise the problem of access within 
the wider population. Thus, the attempt to gain wider 
female representation within a category of cocoa 
farmers tends to overestimate the participation of 
women in cocoa, since it excludes or does not focus on 
the experience of women outside of the cocoa sector 
or particular food commodity under investigation. 
To compensate for this, research in the Suhum-
Ayensuano area attempted to record the livelihoods 
and locations of the various siblings of interviewed 
farmers. However, many of the interviewers could not 
Table 4.6 Residence of siblings in the Suhum-Ayensuano area
Residence Male  (%) Female (%) Total  (%) No. of siblings
Same settlement 82.8 64.2 70.3 470
Other rural settlement 6.8 33.1 24.4 163
Nearby town 10.0 1.6 4.3 29
Accra 0.5 1.1 0.7 6
Town in another region 221 447 668 668
Total 221 447 668 668
Source: Authors’ own
Table 4.5. Occupations of cocoa farmers and their siblings in Suhum-Ayensuano
Occupation Male  (%) Female (%) Total  (%) No. of farmers
Farming cocoa in home village 46 33 41 45
Farming cocoa elsewhere 3 4 4 4
Food crop farming 3 0 2 2
Trader, artisan, self-employed informal sector 26 49 36 39
Professional
Retired 6 0 4 4
Don’t know 3 0 2 2
Other 19 14 15 8
Total 65 45 110 110
Source: Authors’ own
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remember all their siblings and were not aware of their 
current livelihoods. This was complicated by the fact 
that there may be many half-siblings arising from the 
multiple marriages of fathers. As a result, only 16 of the 
interviewed farmers in the qualitative survey at Suhum-
Ayensuano were able to produce comprehensive 
information of all their siblings.  Even this does not 
seem to be fully accurate though, since of the total 110 
recorded cases, only 45 were women, which suggests 
that some female siblings may have been forgotten 
– it is unlikely that there was such a disproportionate 
number of males among siblings. Forty-one per cent 
of these siblings continued to farm cocoa in the village, 
while 36 per cent had moved into trading, artisanal and 
informal sector occupations (see Table 4.5). Only 4 per 
cent were farming cocoa elsewhere, and only 2 per 
cent had shifted out of cocoa into food crop farming. 
The movement into trading, artisanal and informal 
sector occupations was most significant among 
women, with 49 per cent of women involved in these 
sectors compared to 26 per cent of men. Conversely, 
46 per cent of men were farming cocoa in the village 
compared to 33 per cent of women. This movement 
into the trading and artisanal sectors was associated 
with migration out of the village. While 40 per cent of 
the siblings resided in the village and 9 per cent had 
moved to other rural sectors, 30 per cent had moved 
to nearby towns and 20 per cent to Accra (see Table 
4.6). Again, this was more significant among women, of 
which 36 per cent resided in nearby towns compared 
to 22 per cent of men. This suggests that there is a 
significant movement out of cocoa arising from either 
lack of availability of land or lack of capital and labour 
to carry out replanting and rehabilitation of cocoa. 
However, we do not know the previous distribution of 
rural people within cocoa, and Hill’s (1963) maps of land 
holdings show the overwhelming dominance of men in 
ownership and inheritance of land. Hill also documents 
that many farmers left their cocoa plantations following 
swollen shoot disease in the 1950s, and often gave 
it out to more distant relatives, presumably with less 
access to land of their own. This suggests processes 
of better-off farmers moving out of cocoa following 
swollen shoot, and the transfer of lands to other 
categories of farmers, foreshadowing the emergence 
of sharecropping.
4.2 Sharecropping 
The higher incidence of sharecropping in Suhum-
Ayensuano than in Juaboso is related to complex 
historical factors, rooted both in land pressures and land 
shortages in the Suhum-Ayensuano area, but also in 
the replanting of old cocoa and the history of ecological 
crises that started with the swollen shoot epidemic of 
the 1950s. These crises resulted in an outmigration 
of cocoa farmers to new western frontier land, and 
a movement out of cocoa into other crops, or out of 
farming into other occupations. Farmers experienced 
increasing difficulty in replanting cocoa. Those farmers 
unable to meet the increasing labour requirements 
and costs were forced to lease their land out to other 
farmers, who have sufficient labour and capital to carry 
out replanting, on a sharecrop arrangement.  
Hill (1963, p. 11) noted that the 1950s swollen shoot 
epidemic resulted in a shift in access to land to many 
people without direct claims on the land:
‘Many farmers prefer not to clarify their 
relationship to a farm over which they have 
assumed effective charge – presuming that any 
request for clarification which might be put to 
the relatives would raise questions that better lie 
latent. Much of this indeterminacy has resulted 
from the chaos following the swollen shoot 
disease. Many resident farmers seem indifferent 
to the fact that the farm they are in charge of 
is registered in the name of (say) an absent 
brother…. The more sophisticate farmer may try 
to justify the fact that it is he who is replanting the 
farm by referring to his obligation to his brother, 
while those who are not trying to rationalize their 
behaviour will casually convey the casualness of 
the situation’.
While Hill (1963) postulated that the swollen shoot 
disease might result in the transfer of ownerships 
and emergence of full individual rights, the actual 
outcome has been the consolidation of a system of 
sharecropping among relatives, between the inheritors 
of land and more distant and junior relatives with less 
claims on the land. This became more pronounced in 
the Eastern Region as wealthy farmers began to shift 
towards investments in land in the Western Region. 
Currently sharecropping between relatives is quite 
common within the Suhum-Ayensuano area. Labour 
has also become scarce, as labourers have also moved 
to the new frontier areas in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, 
where they can get better remuneration for less work.
With the attainment of independence new 
opportunities were created for urban employment. 
Given its very close proximity to Accra, many people 
from Suhum-Ayensuano also migrated to Accra. Many 
of the wealthier cocoa farmers also invested in the 
education of their children, which resulted in the rise 
of a professional class with landed cocoa interests. 
The large-scale farmers migrating into new frontier 
cocoa areas or converting into trade and professional 
employments continued to retain their land, which they 
gained an income from by sharecropping with poorer 
relatives or non-related farmers. This rise in urban 
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landed interests (‘gentlemen [who] don’t like to farm’) 
is reflected in some of the extended interviews with 
sharecropping tenants of urban-based relatives. For 
instance, Akosua, a woman farmer at Brong Densuso, 
farmed on land belonging to her matrilineage. The son 
of her maternal uncle, a businessman who resides 
abroad, inherited the land. He had contracted it out 
to her on a half share (abunu) arrangement. She was 
responsible for meeting all the costs of farming and 
hiring of labour.
In other circumstances sharecropping emerges as 
more of a reciprocal relationship between farmers with 
land but insufficient capital or labour to rehabilitate old 
plantations, and farmers with labour and sometimes 
capital but insufficient land of their own. This is often a 
relationship between older farmers who are no longer 
strong enough to farm and younger relatives without 
land or capital, but with sufficient strength to maintain 
a cocoa farm. For instance, in an interview at Ayisaa, 
Govina Wilson narrated:
‘My father started the farm many years ago. I 
took charge of the farm about six years ago. But 
before that I was helping my father on the farm 
when I was young… I had to replace some of the 
trees and these ones are now growing….  I share 
with my father. He is old now and it was as a 
result of his hard work that I came to be farming 
on the land. So, I give him a larger portion of my 
share so he can take care of himself’.
While this farmer did not specify an exact sharing 
arrangement, others did in their interviews. Kwame 
Sakyi, at Bokoekrom, Suhum-Ayensuano, who 
works a 1.2ha  cocoa farm owned by his sister-in-law 
explained, ‘We have an abusa sharecrop arrangement 
where I take two parts of the money from selling the 
cocoa and she gets one third. She used to farm the 
land but because of old age she can’t anymore’.
Smallholder farmers often invest in cocoa farms to 
provide for them in their old age, with the intention 
of releasing it to a younger person on a sharecrop 
arrangement. For example, Amos Larbi, with half a 
hectare of cocoa at Bekoekrom stated: ‘My father told 
me that if you are farming cocoa, when you grow old 
and cannot work, you could give the farm to someone 
to work on it so you get something to eat. It is a good 
investment’.
Some of these types of arrangements operate in 
a grey zone between sharecropping tenants who 
replant a cocoa farm and sharecrop labourers who 
work on previously established plantations. Sharecrop 
relations can change over time as cocoa plantations 
age. Sometimes a farmer is provided with a farm to 
take care of in exchange for a third share. When the 
farm ages the caretaker may engage in the replanting, 
in which case the arrangements are renegotiated, and 
the sharecropper now receives half of the proceeds. 
For example, Kofi Amankwa narrated:
‘When I heard that my grandmother’s relatives 
were here at Ayisaa, I decided to go to them. 
When I got to Ayisaa, I realised my uncle had 
made a farm there. So, I decided to stay and I 
started working on his farm... In the beginning, 
when I started working, there was cocoa on the 
land and the arrangement was abusa…In the 
third year of my service, the cocoa trees were 
cut down because of akate [capsid insect pests] 
on the farms. From that time, my uncle told me 
to take the land and plant it with cocoa so that 
we will share it equally. We entered into a new 
arrangement where we stopped abusa and now 
do abunu. With the new arrangement, I became 
the sole manager of the farm’.
Sharecropping is also common among the children 
of men in matrilineal lineages, where fathers without 
sufficient land of their own seek to gain sharecropping 
contracts for their sons with the landholding elders 
of their lineage. The land may be passed on to the 
children of sons on favourable terms such as a third 
share going to the lineage rather than the half. In these 
instances a maternal nephew or brother of the original 
cocoa farmer inherits the land (Amanor, 2010).   
Among close family members, the share given to the 
owner of the land or the head of the lineage may not 
necessarily be directly specified. For instance, Felicia 
Oppong has a 1.2ha cocoa plantation at Bekoekrom, 
which she inherited from her deceased father. Every 
year she provides her father’s junior brothers with 
accounts and a share of the proceeds. However, there 
is no formal arrangement defining how the yield is to 
be shared:
‘I account for the yields to my fathers’ junior 
brothers and they take some of the proceeds 
or money and I also take some. What I give to 
them is to be used to take care of the family 
house. There is no clear-cut arrangement. It is a 
father-daughter relationship so we did not come 
to any form of agreement on the terms to share 
the proceeds of the land. All I can say is that, I 
give them some of the proceeds, which they use 
to take care of the house and I also use the rest 
for my family’.
Similarly, Jonathan Ntow, who is 25 years old, works 
on 1.2ha of the family land of his mother. Recently 
the family head has requested that ‘he brings 
something’ to support the family house. This rise of 
sharecropping and sharing on family land is indicative 
of the increasing shortage of land and that it cannot 
support all family members. Those who gain access 
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to family land for cocoa are expected to provide some 
part of the proceeds to the family head for the upkeep 
of the family.
Some of these sharecropping relations can be quite 
complex. Afari Kisiedu presently takes care of his 
father’s 4.8ha cocoa farm and another 1.2ha that 
belonged to a maternal uncle. His father’s land was 
inherited by one of his father’s maternal nephews. 
The 4.8ha farm is subject to an abusa arrangement, in 
which he retains 1.6 ha as his own farm and manages 
the other 3.2 ha for his father’s nephew, who resides in 
the town of Akropong. Most of his father’s landowning 
relatives are urban-based professional workers. 
Although he is responsible for managing the farm, his 
father’s nephew pays for labourers on the 3.2ha farm. 
In addition, his mother left a 2.4ha cocoa farm to him 
and his three siblings. His younger brother looks after 
this land and after the harvest of cocoa the proceeds 
are shared equally between the four siblings.
The costs of rehabilitating cocoa have resulted in 
the rise of sharecrop tenants and a movement from 
sharecrop caretakers to sharecrop tenants. Farmers 
who have found it difficult to meet the costs of 
replanting from their own capital and labour often turn 
to tenant farmers and junior relatives to carry out this 
task as part of a sharecrop arrangement. The tenant 
caretaker usually receives a half of the crop. Similar 
relations were also recorded in focus group discussions 
carried out at Juaboso where farmers described the 
recent rise of sharecrop tenancies resulting from the 
costs of replanting cocoa. Elderly cocoa farmers 
with larger farms in the Juaboso area are currently a 
major source of land for sharecropping, due to their 
inability to replant dying plantations. In earlier times 
most sharecroppers were migrants and gained access 
to forestland through sharecropping arrangements 
with indigenous chiefs and landowners (Boni, 2005). 
As uncultivated land becomes increasingly scarce for 
indigenes many of them are forced to gain access 
to land through sharecropping on old plantations, 
and often with elderly family members without the 
resources to engage in replanting old cocoa.
Sharecropping tenancies mainly arise in four different 
contexts:
1. In new frontier areas in which land sales of 
uncultivated forest are active it emerges between 
landowners without capital, and labour to develop 
cocoa plantations. The landlords release mature 
forested land for the tenants to convert into 
cocoa plantations.  After the plantations start 
bearing cocoa the land is divided between the 
landowner and the tenant and the tenants share 
is recognised as their own land, which they can 
pass on to their heirs. Hill (1956) noted that in the 
Eastern Region the arrangements from the 1920s 
involved landlords receiving two thirds of the cocoa 
plantation and tenants one third. With the decline 
of forest frontiers this has been transformed into a 
relationship for replanting old cocoa, in which the 
land can be shared equally between tenant and 
landlord. In the Western Region, the sharecrop 
arrangements has always involved a split of the 
farm when it starts fruiting, probably because 
labour became more available than in the early 
days of cocoa in the Eastern Region.
2. As a relationship between tenants in search of 
land and landowners with surplus land in which 
the landowner is interested in gaining rent from 
the land. 
3. As land becomes increasingly scarce, 
sharecropping emerges between the wealthy 
and poor sections of lineages with the large 
landowners releasing land to their poorer relations 
on sharecropping terms, again with a strong 
interest in extracting rent from their land. 
4. As a more reciprocal relationship between kin 
in which those unable to replant cocoa or with 
insufficient labour and capital to manage cocoa 
production enter into a relationship with close 
relatives to produce cocoa. This can occur 
between elderly and young relatives. It can also 
occur among the children of men in matrilineal 
lineages, in which the father secures lineage land 
for the son on a sharecrop arrangement, since the 
son does not have formal kinship rights to the land.
Sharecropping may occur as an arrangement between 
a landowner and a tenant to make or replant a cocoa 
plantation, or as a labour arrangement on an existing 
cocoa plantation to manage, weed, and harvest the 
cocoa. However, the distinction between these two 
arrangements become increasingly blurred as cocoa 
becomes susceptible to disease and its management 
involves a regime of replanting old and diseased 
portions of farms.
Sharecropping is also an important avenue for women 
to gain access to land. Fourteen per cent of women in 
the quantitative survey had cocoa plantations gained 
under sharecropping arrangements compared to 24 
per cent of men. At Suhum-Ayensuano, 30 per cent of 
women acquired sharecropped plots compared to 47 
per cent of men, while at Juaboso 4 per cent of women 
sharecropped compared to 5 per cent of men. 
Sharecropping has emerged as the major avenue for 
land leasing within the cocoa sector, as land becomes 
an increasingly scarce commodity. It has emerged as 
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a way of financing the replanting of old cocoa farms 
to compensate for increasing costs of production 
and the need to expend more resources on labour, 
agrochemicals and fertilisers to maintain productivity 
(Ruf, 2010). However, sharecropping also enables 
non-farming absentee landlords to extract agricultural 
rent from rural people, including their own kin, without 
necessarily investing in the cost of cocoa replanting.
4.3 Contemporary pressures on land 
appropriation and loss of land
While many farmers are experiencing rising 
land shortages, access to land is increasingly 
gained through family redistribution and through 
sharecropping relations, rather than through outright 
land purchase. Redistribution within the family often 
takes place through sharecropping arrangements, 
which addresses the fact that those who gain 
access to land gain a privileged access that others 
may not share, and thus they provide a portion of 
their surplus profit to maintain redistribution within 
extended families. However, extended families are also 
characterised by social differentiation, and in some 
instances the wealth acquired by previous generations 
of commercial cocoa farmers has been invested in 
other sectors, including trade and education, enabling 
their descendants to move into urban professions. 
These urban professionals have often retained their 
control over land, extracting rents from sharecropping 
with their poorer relatives and with other farmers. In 
other instances, farmers have been unable to afford 
the high costs of labour involved in rehabilitating cocoa 
plantations, and have given it out to sharecrop tenants 
to develop. High cocoa production costs can result 
in poorer farmers releasing their land to sharecrop 
tenants, who are better able to meet these costs, 
although this often results in low returns for both 
parties. This can adversely affect women farmers, who 
experience greater difficulty in gaining access to land, 
and are often more dependent upon hiring labour.
A focus on promoting land markets, individual 
property rights, collateral loans for investments in 
agricultural commercialisation, and the uptake of new 
hybrid varieties and inputs, is not likely to strengthen 
the land rights of the poor and of women, who often 
depend on secondary rights in land allocated through 
the family (Peters, 2013). This can create further 
pressures of indebtedness, as farmers who are 
unable to meet the increasing expenditure on labour 
and inputs are forced to release their land through 
sharecropping to others in a better condition to meet 
these requirements, or family elders select richer 
members over poorer kin to cultivate family land 
because they have more capital to invest in inputs.
The development of private land markets and rights 
can also fuel speculation in land and the expansion of 
purchases in land by commercial farmers and aspiring 
urban-based entrepreneurs seeking to invest in 
agriculture. Land reforms that seek to secure individual 
property rights and decentralise management of this 
process to traditional authorities, can empower chiefs 
to alienate user rights that are not clearly defined, to 
(urban-based) commercial farmers, and to redefine 
what constitutes customary property and the evolution 
of customary practice to modern conditions (Boni, 
2005; Amanor, 2008; Yaro, 2012).  In the Ayensuano 
area, during research, several farmers were anxious 
that the paramount chiefs over the land were 
negotiating the sale of their land to prospective rubber 
commercial farmers and finding ways of ejecting them 
from the land. It is extremely difficult to legislate to 
protect the land rights of the vulnerable and women, 
particularly in circumstances in which available family 
land cannot meet the needs of all family members and 
family redistribution is subject to a process of selection 
that may be influenced by economic circumstances 
and power relations. These cannot be addressed 
through legally strengthening abstract individual 
property rights, when the acquisition of these rights 
by the wealthier segments of society often erodes the 
user rights of the poor.
In summary, over the last 100 years there has been 
a significant shift in cocoa production from a process 
of extensive farming associated with the acquisition of 
large parcels of land, acquisitions of multiple farms, 
and acquisition of lands in new forested frontier 
areas.  These large holdings were broken up as the 
land purchasing cocoa farmers allocated portions to 
extended kin who had helped them in transferring 
forest into habited settlements with access to markets 
and roads. Migrant smallholders were also able to join 
land-purchasing companies, which collected financial 
contributions from farmers to purchase large tracts 
of land, which were subsequently divided among 
the members. Within local communities, farmers 
could also establish cocoa by clearing uncultivated 
forestland with their kinsfolk and claiming it as their 
own land or on land already cleared and claimed and 
by their lineage. The opening up of cocoa by large 
migrant farmers frequently attracted labour to the new 
frontier areas, which could be subsequently hired by 
local farmers to create smaller cocoa plantations with 
more modest capital outlays. In many areas labour 
was the main constraint preventing the expansion of 
cocoa farming, until labourers began migrating to the 
area. As land became scarcer and new frontier land no 
longer existed, the opportunities to accumulate capital 
in cocoa became more limited. Land became less 
available on the market and landowners sought to gain 
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rental income from sharecrop contracts rather than 
land sales, partly to hedge against the rising values 
of land. Extended families shifted from institutions for 
transferring land to members willing to work (Hill, 1963), 
to protecting the landed interests of those at the centre 
of the family and releasing land to the more distant lines 
of the family on sharecrop relations. This is evident from 
the differences in land ownership between the older 
cocoa lands in Suhum-Ayensuano, where smaller 
lands and sharecropping are more prevalent, and the 
more recent cocoa frontiers of Juaboso in which youth 
and women are able to gain land from their families 
and women from their husbands. The decline of land 
access through family members makes it harder for 
many women to gain access to land for cocoa farming. 
However, this is only one part of the story, since the 
ability to participate in cocoa farming has also been 
influenced by changing ecological relations, the 
decline of forests and the rise of epidemics in cocoa 
since the swollen shoot crisis of the 1950s. The cost 
of replanting and rehabilitating old cocoa farms in 
declining forest areas has also limited the abilities of 
farmers to participate in cocoa and resulted in the 
advent of sharecropping. The next section explores 
changes in the labour relations and changes brought 
about by the increasing labour requirements of farming 
as new frontier areas decline.
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Cocoa production is labour intensive, requiring about 
four rounds of weeding every year, removal of mistletoes 
and other epiphytes, shade management through 
pruning, removal of basal suckers, and then harvesting, 
opening the pods, fermenting and drying the beans 
(Dormon et al., 2004). Labour requirements for cocoa 
production have been estimated at 136 man-days per 
ha (Bray, 1959), l05 man-days per ha (Urquhart, 1961) 
and 109 man-days per ha (Beckett, 1944) in forested 
land. These labour requirements increase as the 
original vegetation is replaced by secondary bush and 
grassland, as more invasive weeds move into the forest 
and as cocoa becomes more vulnerable to diseases. 
Ruf (2010) estimates that in Côte d’Ivoire the number of 
days of labour on a hectare of land in the first year of 
creating a plantation increases from 86 days in primary 
forest to 168 for replanting.  
As a result of these labour requirements hired labour 
has been central to the development of cocoa 
production since its inception. Labour is intricately 
related to the dynamics of frontier settlement, access 
to land, family relations and the scale of production. 
The earliest cocoa farmers depended upon both 
extended family labour and hired labour. Hired labour 
was largely drawn from migrant labour. The earliest 
labourers were drawn from people originating from the 
Accra Plains, Volta Region and Togo. By the 1920s, the 
dominant migrants originated from northern Ghana 
and Sahelian countries, including Haute Volta, Mali 
and Niger – from areas largely designated as labour 
reserves by colonial authorities, in which people were 
forced to migrate to meet tax obligations (Hill, 1956; 
Amanor, 1994; Austin, 2005).
The dominant systems of hired labour in the colonial 
period included:
1. the nkotokoano system, in which the labourer was 
remunerated at the end of the season by a fixed 
payment per bag of cocoa harvested; 
2. the annual labour system; 
3. the abusa caretaker/labourer system;
4. casual labour, hired on a daily rate (Hill 1956, 1963; 
Austin, 2005). 
The abusa caretaker sharecropping system was a 
later innovation than monetary contracts (Austin, 
2005). Sharecropping emerged as cocoa planters 
established their early farms and acquired new lands. 
The established farms were given out to labourers 
on a third share and family labour was used to open 
up new farming areas and establish new plantations. 
During the expansionary stage of cocoa from the 
1920s to 1960s, sharecropping labour was common 
in the older frontier areas on mature plantations, while 
extended family labour prevailed in the new frontier 
areas (Hill 1956, 1963; Amanor, 2010).  Austin (2005, 
p. 319) provides detailed instances of this type of 
arrangement: ‘Kwaku Gyekyi and Kojo Bah’s practice 
was to use wage labourers to supplement their own 
and their conjugal families’ energies in making new 
cocoa farms; then hand them over to abusa caretakers 
when the trees started yielding’.
Austin (2005) argues that in Asante, sharecropping 
replaced monetary contracts as a result of the price 
volatility of cocoa, and the failure of cocoa farmers 
to honour the annual payments due to labourers. 
In this context the labourers began to demand a 
transformation of annual payments into a share of the 
proceeds of the harvest.  
Annual and abusa labourers were mainly employed on 
established cocoa plantations. However, when these 
plantations became old and in need of rehabilitation 
the labour often migrated to newer frontier areas, 
where remuneration was often better and labour less 
intense, resulting in labour shortages (Amanor, 2010). 
By the 1970s, the structure of labour within the cocoa 
sector in Ghana was transformed. The rapid expansion 
of the cocoa industry in neighbouring Côte d’Ivoire 
resulted in surplus world production and declining 
international prices. Since the cost of production in 
Côte d’Ivoire was significantly lower than in the old 
frontier areas in Ghana, labour was more attractively 
remunerated. Consequently, Sahelian migrant labour 
relocated from Ghana to the Côte d’Ivoire. Farm 
labour within the Ghanaian cocoa sector became 
increasingly scarce and shifted largely to casual 
labour by local youth (Amanor, 2010). The high costs 
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of rehabilitating old plantation also made the abusa 
caretaker system increasingly redundant, since it was 
adapted to established plantations in forested areas, 
and the costs of replanting cocoa in secondary fallow 
was much higher than in mature forest.  Thus, in old, 
rehabilitated frontier districts abusa labourers were 
often replaced by wage labour, and when the farmer 
could not afford wage labour, they contracted out the 
land to a sharecrop tenant to manage the process of 
rehabilitating old plantations.
5.1 Contemporary labour relations in 
Suhum-Ayensuano and Juaboso
 
Seventy-three per cent of farmers interviewed in the 
two areas hired labour on their cocoa farms. Eighty-one 
per cent of farmers within the Suhum-Ayensuano area 
hired labour, compared to 65 per cent at Juaboso. In 
both settlements more women hired labour than men. 
Seventy-five per cent of women hired labour compared 
to 71 per cent of men. In the Suhum-Ayensuano area, 
84 per cent of women hired labour compared to 80 per 
cent of men and at Juaboso, 68 per cent of women 
compared to 63 per cent of men.
Farmers in Suhum-Ayensuano were more likely to 
engage in sharecropping than at Juaboso, but they 
also depended more upon hired labour despite having 
smaller farms than those found at Juaboso. This 
suggests that farmers at Juaboso are more able to 
meet their labour requirements by mobilising existing 
family labour, rather than depending upon hired labour. 
In the context of the different tasks carried out on 
farms, the most significant difference in the two areas 
was in the use of hired labour for land clearance. Only 
15 per cent of farmers at Juaboso hired labour for 
farm clearance, compared to 48 per cent at Suhum-
Ayensuano (see Table 5.1). This seems to relate to the 
different dynamics of frontier development within the 
two areas.  Replanting has become a recurrent event 
for decades in the Suhum-Ayensuano area but is more 
recent in Juaboso. At Juaboso, farmers were able to 
mobilise neighbouring kin to help in the clearing of 
land, while at Suhum-Ayensuano the fragmentation of 
the family, resulting from movements to new frontier 
areas and the increasing transformation of family land 
into sharecrop tenures, constrains the mobilisation of 
family members for farm work. Thus, the use of labour 
is connected with dynamics of frontier settlement and 
the role of family labour in cocoa cultivation.
In a focus group discussion with male farmers at 
Juaboso-Nkwanta, one participant recounted the 
various labour requirements in managing cocoa, but 
also the importance of family labour in creating cocoa 
farms:  
‘When one acquires land for cocoa, you need 
to cut trees, clear undergrowth, and burn it. 
After which you plant cocoyam, plantain and 
other food crops, which is then intercropped 
with the cocoa seedlings to provide shade…. 
Without a thorough regime of weeding the farm 
– at least four times annually – the cocoa will not 
grow well. After this, husbands with or without 
the help of labourers clear the forestland. Their 
wives normally plant the food crops, while the 
men plant the cocoa. If he has two wives, he 
will make boundaries on the farm to indicate the 
area that each wife and her children will control. 
When the trees grow, we need to prune, spray 
and weed under them. During the harvest 
season…you need harvesters, carriers, breakers 
and dryers. You can use a combination of family 
labour, casual by-day labour, abusa caretaker, 
annual labour caretaker, abunu sharecropper, 
and work parties to carry out these tasks’.
Another participant captured the changing nature of 
labour as the farm ages:  
‘In the past we worked our farms with our wives 
and children. But now labourers are gradually 
replacing or complementing family labour. We 
have by-day workers and some labourers who 
work per acre and they are paid accordingly. 
Other farmers also hire labourers who will work 
on the land for a year and they are paid a fixed 
Table 5.1. Percentage of men and women farmers using hired labour
Type of labour Suhum-Ayensuano (%) Juaboso (%) Total sample (%) Total no. 
of farmers
Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total
Land clearance 47.6 49.4 48.1 12.8 19.2 15.2 29.8 32.0 30.6 517
Weeding 76.2 80.5 77.6 58.7 65.4 61.2 67.3 71.8 68.9 517
Pruning 42.7 48.4 44.8 38.4 44.2 40.6 40.5 46.4 42.6 517
Harvesting 66.5 72.7 68.5 48.8 50 49.3 57.4 59.7 58.2 517
No. of farmers 164 77 241 172 104 276 336 181 517
Source: Authors’ own
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rate and provided with some other welfare 
arrangements. Those who work for a year are 
fully catered for in terms of feeding, health, 
inputs, accommodation – as if they belong 
to your household (adopted labourers) – but 
they still receive a payment at the end of the 
year as agreed. Many of these labourers are 
young migrant men and children mostly from 
the North. This arrangement was in existence 
before this community was established, but it is 
becoming difficult to find labourers now unlike 
in the past’.
In contrast, family labour was much less significant on 
farms in the Suhum-Ayensuano districts.  The family 
lands have become highly fragmented and situated 
in different settlements. They are usually allocated to 
one of a number of siblings or given out on sharecrop 
tenancies. Siblings are often located in different 
settlements, working on different plots of land. As a 
result, it is difficult to mobilise extended family labour 
and farmers rely more on casual hired daily labour.
5.2 Family labour
Most of the cocoa farms at Juaboso continue to be 
worked with family labour. The largest male farmers 
often have plots in different areas, which they allocate 
to different wives to weed and manage with their 
children after they have cleared and planted the land 
with cocoa. These farmers control the income from 
these cocoa plantations after harvest, part of which 
they redistributed to their wives and children. The 
main incentive for their wives and children is future 
inheritance of the land they work. Similar arrangements 
have existed in the Suhum-Ayensuano area in the past 
(Hill, 1963), but these types of arrangements are no 
longer common, since farmers do not have sufficient 
land to allocate to wives or children. As has been 
discussed above, family land is often allocated to a 
select group of lineage members, who often share 
their crop with the lineage elders, or are allocated it 
on a sharecrop arrangement. Most families do not 
have sufficient land to allocate to all their children. As 
a result, kin are highly mobile and spread out through 
many different settlements or have moved into other 
livelihoods. It is therefore not common for farmers to 
rely on close kin, or even on their own children for 
help in farm labour. The scarcity of land often results 
in sharecropping relations replacing family farming, 
and co-operation between close family kin being 
expressed through sharecropping arrangements and 
variants on sharecropping, which, as we have seen, 
can even extend to parents and children.
In contrast, in Juaboso farmers continue to mobilise 
extended family labour in farm work to which they add 
casual labour, if they have the financial resources. As 
one 27-year-old cocoa farmer at Abrokofe stated: ‘I do 
not usually hire labour because most of the time, my 
siblings and even my mother help in farming activities. 
It is only when I am going to weed that I usually hire 
about two labourers’.
However, many farmers cannot afford to hire labour. 
As one 49-year-old farmer at Juaboso Nkwanta 
commented:
‘I don’t have money to hire labourers so I do 
the work myself. I do the work with my wife 
because my children are too young to assist. 
I hire labourers when I have some money, but 
it is rare’. 
Family labour is more prevalent at Juaboso than 
Suhum-Ayensuano, but it is also declining as 
land becomes scarcer and farm production more 
commodified. Recent child labour and education 
policies and laws are eroding the use of young labour 
on farms. As a consequence, many young people are 
growing up without the experience of farm work and 
turning to other livelihoods. Farmers are becoming less 
reliant on child labour. Some farmers are turning to 
sharecropping arra+ngements to replace family labour. 
As a young man at Juaboso Nkwanta stated: ‘Some 
parents are so old and cannot even work on the farm 
but they will not give their cocoa farms to their children 
to manage, but rather a total stranger will get the farm 
as a caretaker’.
5.3 Hired labour
Four distinct forms of hired labour exist in the two 
districts: daily labour, contract labour, abusa and 
annual labour. The first two are allocated to specific 
farm tasks over a short period of time, while the latter 
two are concerned with the management of the whole 
cocoa plantation over a period of a whole farm season 
or more. Local youth and small farmers seeking to 
supplement their farm incomes provide most of the 
casual labour. In Juaboso there is also a significant 
sector of migrant labourers from Togo and northern 
Ghana. Although migrant labour was significant in 
Suhum-Ayensuano in the colonial economy it has 
declined as the cocoa frontier moved westwards, and 
the main labourers are now local. 
The two dominant forms of task specific labour are the 
by-day and the contract labour system (adopaa). The 
by-day system involves payment to a labourer hired 
on a daily basis to form a specific task. The labourer 
usually works from 8am to 12pm. The adopaa system 
is used for weeding a specific area of the farm and for 
pruning cocoa trees. In the Suhum-Ayensuano area, 
weeding contracts are usually negotiated for small 
28 Working Paper 076 | November 2021
areas of farm measured by ‘ropes’ (ahoma) consisting 
of a number of arm spans – which may be 10 by 10 
or 15 by 15. In Juaboso, the adopaa system has also 
been adapted to scarcity of credit among farmers with 
migrant labourer gangs from Togo working in advance 
of payment after the cocoa harvest. For example, one 
male focus group participant stated:
‘Usually when these labourers come, they work 
on multiple farms and write the names of the 
farmers and amount owed them down. So, 
when it is harvesting time, they come back to 
the communities and go to these farmers to 
collect their monies. Usually, they measure the 
farm by the acre and charge you accordingly. If 
they are weeding the cocoa farm, they charge 
about GH₵100 per acre.5 If it is a food crops 
farm, they may charge between GH₵50–80. 
Sometimes, you can negotiate with them and 
they will take GH₵50 for weeding the food farm. 
When the harvesting season is in, then they 
come back for their money. Even yesterday we 
made a public announcement that those who 
came to do the credit labour have come back to 
the community, so those who owe them should 
pay them’. 
A 52-year-old male cocoa farmer interviewed at 
Abrokofe narrated:
I go for the long-term labourer (adopaa) 
because you can pay them on credit. As for the 
by-day they charge for the day and you have 
to pay at the end of the day but the long-term 
labourer will take the money after you harvest 
- and they weed, cut mistletoe and do other 
things you require. 
The annual labourers and abusa caretakers are 
responsible for looking after established cocoa 
plantations. They perform all the farm tasks, including 
weeding, pruning and harvesting. The annual labourer 
is remunerated after harvest with a pre-agreed amount, 
while the abusa caretaker receives a third of the 
harvest. The landlord is responsible for the purchase 
of inputs. However, the abusa caretakers may choose 
to hire additional labour at their own cost. As outlined 
by a farmer in a focus group discussion at Abrokofe, 
the work of an abusa caretaker includes the following:
weeding three times a year, cutting of mistletoe 
two times a year, and if he knows how to spray 
and you have the machine then he will spray 
while his wife fetches the water. If he hires 
someone to do the spraying, he will have to 
bear the cost. If the farm owner doesn’t have 
the machine, then hiring the machine becomes 
5 At the time of the interview the exchange rate was about GH₵6 to US$1.
his expense. But even if you have the machine 
and the caretaker doesn’t know how to use it 
then you the farm owner can do the spraying to 
prevent the destruction of the machine.
In Juaboso most of the annual labourers and 
caretakers originate from northern Ghana. They 
are mainly employed by the larger cocoa farmers. 
Most smallholders using daily or contract labour to 
supplement their household labour. While annual 
labourers and abusa caretakers were common in the 
Suhum-Ayensuano area in the colonial days, they have 
largely disappeared. The fragmentation of farms results 
in most Suhum-Ayensuano farmers using casual 
daily or contract labour rather than annual or abusa 
labourers. In Suhum-Ayensuano, replanting of cocoa 
has resulted in the replacement of abusa caretakers 
by abunu tenants, who bear the costs of replanting 
of cocoa. The abusa caretaker system is only cost 
effective on larger plantations, where the costs of 
hiring large amounts of daily labour are deemed to be 
a significant drain on the financial reserves of farmers. 
In the Suhum-Ayensuano area the high costs involved 
in replanting cocoa, results in many farmers seeking 
to lease out their land under the abunu sharecropping 
tenant system, when they have difficulty in meeting 
these costs.
Labour has been a major constraint in cocoa farming 
from its inception. In many areas the uptake of cocoa 
among local farmers was dependent upon migrant 
farmers laying the foundations for the migrants of 
labourers to the area, which then enabled local farmers 
to establish their own plantations. The pioneer cocoa 
farmers of the late nineteenth century initially drew 
upon large networks of family dependent labour, with 
distant origins in domestic slave labour recruited into 
the early nineteenth century oil palm industry (Amanor, 
1994; Hill, 1963; Johnson, 1964; Austin, 2005). Austin 
(2005) also records that domestic slavery and pawns 
(family members taken as security against a loan, who 
provide interest in labour until repayment of the debt) 
were important in the early years of the development 
of the Ashanti cocoa industry (Austin, 2005). By the 
early twentieth century pawnage became replaced by 
pledging of cocoa farms against debt (Austin, 2005). 
Colonial rule and its taxation schemes created new 
opportunities for the hiring of labour; large number of 
migrants from Burkina Faso (then Upper Volta), Niger, 
and Mali moved into Ghana to work in the cocoa 
sector to gain cash incomes. They usually worked as 
annual or abusa labourers. Large cocoa farmers took 
advantage of this large source of labour to complement 
extended family labour, employing migrants on already 
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established cocoa plantations as caretakers while 
using family labour to clear new frontier areas that were 
converted into cocoa farms (Hill, 1956). Women often 
played an important role in this, cultivating the food 
crops among the cocoa seedlings. Plantain was an 
important crop cultivated by women that also provided 
shade to nurse young cocoa seedlings.  However, as 
the cocoa began to form a canopy, food crops could 
no longer be cultivated, and as cocoa became the 
predominant crop within old frontiers there was less 
scope for women and other family members to gain 
livelihoods from food crop farming. By the 1950s and 
1960s labour relations began to change within cocoa; 
rehabilitation and replanting of cocoa in secondary 
bush became dominant in old pioneer areas. Since 
labour in old plantation areas was more arduous 
and farmers in these areas had less disposable 
income (resulting from declining yields, mounting 
disease, and weed problems) migrant labour began 
to relocate to new frontier areas where they received 
more favourable forms of remuneration. By the 1970s, 
this became critical as the cocoa frontier in Ghana 
declined and cocoa cultivation in the new frontier 
areas of Côte d’Ivoire gathered momentum. Migrants 
from neighbouring sahelian countries relocated from 
Ghana to Côte d’Ivoire, which now replaced Ghana as 
the leading global cocoa producers.  As a result, cocoa 
farmers in Ghana could no longer rely on a supply of 
cheap migrant labour.
The combination of declining access to migrant labour 
and declining ability to provide family land for children 
has reshaped labour relations within cocoa. With a lack 
of access to family land a significant proportion of youth 
shifted from working on lineage land to working as 
labourers. They moved to newer frontier areas where 
they hoped to save money from labouring to purchase 
their own land or gain sharecrop contracts. With the 
retraction of youth labour from the family, established 
cocoa farmers have become more dependent upon 
hired labour than before. This labour is now largely 
provided by youth and farmers with insufficient land 
to meet their needs for an income, since most of the 
migrant labourers have left old frontier areas. This has 
resulted in a shift from long-term labour contracts 
(such as annual labourers and abusa labourers) to 
short-term casual day-labour and contract labour. 
Labour has become more expensive. The increased 
costs of labour and of rehabilitating old unproductive 
plantations has created huge expenditure pressures; 
many cocoa farmers sharecrop their land because they 
lack the labour or capital to hire labour to successfully 
maintain cocoa. In many areas of the Eastern Region 
and Ashanti, farmers have shifted out of cocoa into 
other crops. For instance, in the Asesewa area of 
the Eastern Region as early as the 1950s, farmers 
replaced cocoa with maize, taking advantage of the 
proximity of Accra to become a major supplier of urban 
food. In the 1970s, many farmers in the Kwae area of 
the Eastern Region converted to modern hybrid oil 
palm production, which was promoted by government 
services including outgrower schemes. Within areas 
that retain cocoa as a major crop, these shifts in the 
cost of labour have resulted in smaller cocoa farms, 
more allocations of land to sharecrop tenants, and 
increased expenditure on labour. This creates larger 
barriers of entry into cocoa production, resulting in 
its domination by more mature and elderly farmers 
with a large number of younger farmers transformed 
into labourers. This also marginalises women who 
increasingly find the high costs of labour an entry 
barrier to production. Women have less opportunity 
to mobilise family labour as compared with senior 
men. This leaner, more capital-intensive cocoa sector 
favours the male elders at the centre of family lands who 
can use their influence over family affairs and control of 
land to make demands on family labour. These trends 
appear to be more pronounced in older frontier areas. 
Thus, in the older frontier areas of Suhum, farms are 
both smaller and use more hired labour, reflecting the 
declining role of family land and family cooperation in 
production. In the more recent frontiers of Juaboso, 
where family land is still significant, male youth play a 
larger role in family production and cocoa farmers are 
less dependent upon hired labour.  
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In contrast with the widespread usage of hired labour 
by cocoa farmers, significantly fewer farmers purchase 
inputs and seeds. There is a wide disparity between the 
recommendations and visions of the cocoa industry 
and science and technology sectors of farmers 
achieving high yield through planting hybrid seeds 
and using inputs, and the actual practices of most 
farmers. Existing studies provide a very mixed picture 
of uptake of inputs and hybrid seeds by farmers. These 
findings are complicated by the disbursement of free 
inputs and seedlings by government agencies and 
private corporations and mass spraying campaigns 
by government agencies, which can result in the 
appearance of increasing use of inputs by farmers.
Hainmueller, Hiscox, and Tampec (2011) suggest 
that 21 per cent of farmers applied fertilisers and 37 
per cent used agrochemicals. There were significant 
regional variations in this survey. For instance, in 
the Eastern Region, only 9 per cent of farmers used 
fertilisers. In a survey of Eastern, Ashanti and Western 
Regions, Bymolt, Laven, and Tyszler (2018) suggest 
that 39 per cent of farmers used applications of 
granular fertiliser, 53 per cent liquid fertiliser, 88 per 
cent pesticides, 74 per cent fungicides and 51 per cent 
herbicides.  In contrast, drawing on the Ghana Cocoa 
Farmers Survey which has been carried out over a 
number of years, Kolavalli and Vigneri (2017) suggest a 
significant expansion in the use of inputs: with fertilisers 
usage growing from 9 per cent in 2001/2 to 57 per cent 
in 2009/10; and the use of agrochemicals expanding 
from 50 per cent in 2001/2 to 90 per cent in 2010. Ruf 
and Bini (2011) also suggest that 75 per cent of cocoa 
farmers in Ghana use fertilisers compared to only 15 
per cent in Côte d’Ivoire, and that this has resulted 
in much higher yields in Ghana than Côte d’Ivoire. In 
marked contrast, an International Institute of Tropical 
Agriculture survey of Ghanaian and Ivorian cocoa 
farmers carried out in 2009 reported that only 17 per 
cent of Ghanaian and 13 per cent of Ivorian farmers 
used fertilisers (Gockowski and Sonwa, 2011).
Kolavalli and Vigneri (2017) propose that the marked 
uptake in new technologies has resulted in a distinct 
pattern of social differentiation, in which those using 
low technology gain outputs of 400kg/ha, those using 
some inputs gaining between 400 to 800kg/ha, and 
those using high inputs (industry recommendations) 
gaining from 800 to 1,500kg/ha. They suggest that 
those in the lowest category have declined from 85 per 
cent of farmers in 2001 to 65 per cent in 2010, and 
those in the medium category have increased from 12 
per cent in 2001 to 38 per cent in 2010, and those in 
the high yield category from 2 per cent in 2001 to 9 
per cent in 2010. They paint a picture of technology-
induced change gradually but significantly lifting cocoa 
farmers out of poverty. However, these are questionable 
assertions given the variance in existing data. Ruf and 
Bini (2011) also caution that wide variations in yields 
are found among farmers using hybrids and modern 
cultivation techniques in different areas. While yields 
of 4,000kg/ha were found in newly cleared cocoa 
forests (where higher yields are to be expected) in the 
Nzema area, these dropped to around 1,000kg/ha in 
old cocoa plantations in Ashanti.
Upbeat assessments of a significant uptake of 
technology and major gains in yields are also at variance 
with concerns with the increasing impoverishment of 
farmers and the need to facilitate the uptake of new 
technology or exit from cocoa. Odijie (2018) reports 
that when the government of Ghana withdrew its 
support for the free spraying of cocoa farms in 2014, 
yields dropped by 18 per cent, forcing the government 
to reintroduce mass spraying. Odijie (2018) has argued 
that government subsidisation of cocoa has not 
significantly benefitted cocoa farmers in Ghana, but 
rather led to increased impoverishment as world cocoa 
prices decline.
6.1 Use of inputs at Suhum-Ayensuano 
and Juaboso
Quantitative data collected in our two research sites, 
shows that while farmers widely claim to use modern 
hybrid varieties, few of them are able to adhere to the 
recommended management practices for input use, 
particularly in the use of fertilisers that are critical for 
achieving higher yields. Only 16 per cent of farmers 
used fertilisers, and this was often sporadic rather 
than consistent. In Juaboso, only 9 per cent of farmers 
used fertilisers compared to 25 per cent of interviewed 
farmers in Suhum-Ayensuano. However, many of the 
Suhum-Ayensuano farmers only used fertilisers when 
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freely distributed; only 16 per cent of Suhum-Ayensuano 
farmers purchased fertilisers. In contrast with the low 
use of fertilisers, agrochemicals are widely used, with 
89 per cent of all farmers using agrochemicals on their 
farms and 83 per cent purchasing them on the market. 
There are significant regional differences with only 67 
per cent of Suhum-Ayensuano farmers purchasing 
agrochemicals compared to 97 per cent of Juaboso 
farmers (see Table 6.1).
More farmers at Suhum-Ayensuano use fertilisers 
than at Juaboso, and more farmers at Juaboso use 
agrochemicals than those at Suhum-Ayensuano. The 
reasons for differences between Suhum-Ayensuano 
and Juaboso are most likely to be complex. In relation 
to fertilisers this is most obviously (in part) related 
to perceptions of soil fertility. Eighteen per cent of 
farmers interviewed at Suhum-Ayensuano considered 
their soils to be very poor compared to 1.4 per cent 
of farmers at Juaboso. Concerns of poor depleted 
soils were also reflected in the in-depth interviews at 
Suhum-Ayensuano. For example, Ofosu Asamoah, a 
cocoa farmer interviewed at Brong Densuso (Suhum-
Ayensuano) commented:
‘The land’s fertility has declined since we got 
it from our fathers. But with the help of the 
fertilisers the soil is regaining its strength…If not 
for the fertiliser the land would be as infertile as 
it was during our fathers’ time. The land was 
dead when we got it from our fathers’. 
Some farmers at Suhum-Ayensuano use fertilisers 
sporadically to address soil fertility issues rather than 
to specifically increase the yield of cocoa. For instance, 
Afari Kisiedu applies fertiliser every three years to 
address soil exhaustion. Others apply them when freely 
distributed by government but are reluctant to use their 
own scarce capital to make purchases.  However, not 
all farmers at Suhum-Ayensuano suffer from poor soil 
fertility: 38 per cent of the interviewed farmers consider 
their soils to be highly fertile compared to 19 per cent 
of farmers at Juaboso. This is not surprising since the 
soils of the dry semi-deciduous forest zone in which 
Suhum-Ayensuano lies tend to be more naturally fertile 
and more suitable for cocoa cultivation than the more 
acidic soils of the moister forest zone around Juaboso 
(Hall and Swaine, 1981). In contrast, cocoa diseases at 
Juaboso are of much larger concern to farmers than soil 
fertility. This results in priority given to agrochemicals, 
since these are critical in maintaining yields in infested 
cocoa. Therefore, it is likely that widespread scarcity of 
capital and critical conditions of production will force 
the majority of farmers to make choices on where to 
allocate expenditure, rather than to follow extension 
recommendations. These differences are likely related 
to the maturity of cocoa on farms, and the stage of 
replanting of new farms (older farms are more likely 
to be vulnerable to disease), and the types of cocoa 
varieties being planted and their resistance to pests 
and diseases.
While a large number of farmers in both localities plant 
hybrid varieties, these are often combined with older 
Table 6.1. Percentage of farmers using or purchasing inputs in Suhum and Juaboso






Purchase of fertilisers Suhum-Ayensuano 17.7 11.7 15.8 241
Juaboso 7.0 10.6 8.3 276
Total 12.2 11 11.8 517
Use of fertilisers Suhum-Ayensuano 29.9 14.3 24.9 241
Juaboso 7.6 11.5 9.1 276
Total 18.5 12.7 16.4 517
Purchase of agrochemicals Suhum-Ayensuano 70.7 59.7 67.2 241
Juaboso 97.1 94.2 96.0 276
Total 84.2 79.6 82.6 517
Use of agrochemicals Suhum-Ayensuano 81.7 75.3 79.7 241
Juaboso 97.7 96.2 97.1 276
Total 89.9 87.3 89.0 517
Use of modern hybrids Suhum-Ayensuano 43.9 35.1 41.1 241
Juaboso 93.6 97.1 94.9 276
Total 69.3 70.7 69.8 517
Source: Authors’ own
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varieties selected by farmers from trees on their farms. 
Three main varieties are planted by farmers: modern 
hybrids, Amazonia hybrids, and Amelonado (see 
Figure 6.1). The Amelonado varieties (also popularly 
known as Tetteh Quashie) are the original South 
American varieties introduced to the Gold Coast in 
the nineteenth century. The Amazonia hybrids are the 
first generation of hybrids widely distributed during 
the 1970s. These hybrids are no longer produced by 
government services; they have been indigenised by 
farmers, mixed up with older planting materials and 
reselected by farmers for promising traits.6 These 
are mixed with older Amelonado varieties, with some 
farmers classifying these mixes as Amazonia and 
others as Amelonado. The modern hybrids are the new 
generation of fast-maturing high-yielding varieties that 
require large applications of fertilisers and management 
with agrochemicals to achieve high yields. The new 
6 It is likely that some farmers characterise these mixes as Amelonado and others as Amazonia.
hybrid varieties have been widely planted by farmers, 
since they are frequently freely distributed by extension 
services and provided with other free inputs in a 
package as incentives to replace older cocoa. Within 
the quantitative survey, 65 per cent of farmers planted 
modern hybrids, compared to 30 per cent planting 
Amazonia. Around 5 per cent planted Amelonado-
derived seeds. There is a significant variation in the 
uptake of modern hybrids within the two research 
areas, with 92 per cent of farmers within Juaboso 
planting modern hybrids, compared to only 30 per cent 
at Suhum-Ayensuano. The majority of farmers (58 per 
cent) at Suhum-Ayensuano planted Amazonia varieties, 
which they selected from trees on the farms. However, 
over 60 per cent of farmers in the survey selected the 
cocoa that they plant from seeds on trees (see Table 
6.2). Less than 30 per cent of farmers planted certified 
hybrid seeds or seedlings. Many farmers are planting 
Figure 6.1 Cocoa varieties planted on cocoa farms in Suhum Ayensuano and Juaboso
(Percentage of farm plots)























Table 6.2. The sources of cocoa planting materials in Suhum Ayensuano and Juaboso
Seeds source Suhum-Ayensuano
(%)
Juaboso (%) Total (%) T-test P value
Selected from trees around 55.4 65.9 61.4 0.0008
Provided by extension services 16.0 38.2 28.7 0.0000
From NGOS 0.0 0.0 0.0 -
From Farmer association/coop 6.8 5.2 5.9 0.2737
Purchased from private dealer 12.3 7.3 9.5 0.0086
Planting method:
Planted from seeds 55.4 82.3 70.7  0.0000
Seedlings   22.9 21.4 22.1  0.5877
Nursed seedlings before 
planting
10.4 18 14.7  0.0008
Source: Authors’ own
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hybrids from seeds selected from trees (which will not 
breed true) rather from certified seeds and seedlings.
Many farmers expressed some reservations about 
the performance of the new hybrid varieties on their 
farms. The hybrids are generally regarded as maturing 
faster and yielding heavy early crops than the older 
varieties (in Juaboso they are commonly called 
abrewa bedi, meaning that the old lady will eat (profit), 
and in Suhum-Ayensuano akukra bedi – the old man 
will eat, meaning they yield rapidly so old people can 
afford to invest in them and gain a profit  before they 
die). Some farmers regard the hybrid varieties as 
yielding better than the older varieties. For example, 
during an interview , a farmer at Abrokofe in Juaboso 
said, ‘The hybrid variety bears more fruit than Tetteh 
Quashie’. Other farmers at Suhum-Ayensuano regard 
the hybrids of having smaller seeds which provide 
less weight when bagged. While the hybrids may yield 
more in earlier years, they are commonly considered 
to be less robust than the older varieties, and more 
vulnerable to pests and diseases. A familiar theme 
among farmers was the susceptibility of hybrids to 
diseases. For example, when interviewed one 52-year-
old female cocoa farmer from Abrokofe said:
‘When our parents were cultivating the local 
breed, we didn’t know of all these diseases 
that are affecting and destroying our cocoa 
farms now. I think the hybrid variety came with 
these various cocoa diseases we are suffering 
from today’.
A second common theme is the short life span of hybrid 
varieties and their vulnerability. For instance, Solomon 
Okine, a farmer interviewed at Brong Densuso, stated: 
‘I have two acres [0.8ha] of Amazonia and two 
acres of hybrid. The Amazonia is longer lasting 
than the hybrid. Amazonian can stay and 
produce fruits for more that 60 years. Hybrid on 
the other hand can last up to about 25 years. 
Some of the farmers are trying to get back to 
the Amazonia. They give us the hybrids because 
they claim the hybrid produces a faster yield. 
But with the hybrid, you have to be constantly 
giving it fertiliser. It takes about two and a half 
years or sometimes three years to blossom and 
produce fruits. The Amazonia on the other hand 
takes about three and a half years. So, there is 
almost a year interval between them in terms of 
their ability to producing fruits’.
While farmers are not convinced about the advantages 
of hybrid cocoa, they also regard themselves as having 
7 Held at Suhum 28 July 2021.
skills in selecting promising cocoa plants that adapt 
well to their farm environment, a point that is largely 
dismissed in current approaches to the uptake of 
cocoa technology. According to Ofosu Asamoah  a 
farmer interviewed at Brong Densuso:
‘We make our own nursery because we know 
the cocoa plant very well and we believe the 
Amazonia species is very fine. Now if you go to 
my farm, you will see that there is a difference 
between the one they call the hybrid and the 
Amazonia. We have worked with cocoa for a 
very long time; we were born into it, so we know 
the difference. When we find a promising seed, 
we buy that and grow it on our own. As for the 
hybrid I used some but it did not turn out well. 
You will be disappointed once you see them on 
my farm. I even have some Amazonia trees on 
my farm, which have been on the farm since 
my father’s time and are over 50 years old, but I 
cannot say the same for the hybrid’.
Quantitative data collected on estimated yields 
suggested that over 80 per cent of farmers gained 
low yields on their cocoa of under 400kg/ha, while 
13 per cent of farmers gained medium yields of 
between 400-800kg/ha, and only 7 per cent of 
farmers yields of over 800kg/ha. There was also an 
evident inverse relationship between yields and size 
of cocoa plantations, with larger plantations being 
less productive. The most likely reason for this is that 
the larger farmers are unable to expend comparable 
resources on labour and inputs per hectare as 
smallholder farmers. They have overreached their 
capacity to invest in the necessary labour and inputs 
per hectare to achieve optimal management of cocoa. 
Labour is the most critical resource. This is supported 
by the fact that many of the smallholders achieving the 
highest yields (per hectare) are not using hybrid seeds. 
At a workshop at Suhum7 to present the findings of 
research to farmers, one of the model farmers invited 
by the extension services explained that while the 
application of fertilisers could help achieve higher 
yields, this depended upon weeding in a timely fashion, 
since weeds also grew more vigorously when fertilisers 
were applied. Failure to weed and competition from 
weeds nullifies the benefits of applying fertilisers.
Farmers with less than 2ha achieved the highest 
productivity of cocoa within the survey. No farmers 
with five or more ha gained yields of over 800kg/ha 
(see Table 6.3). Farm productivity was relatively higher 
in Suhum-Ayensuano than at Juaboso, which probably 
reflects more intensive cultivation on smaller plots in 
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Suhum-Ayensuano than on the relatively larger farms 
in Juaboso. The increased intensity of cultivation 
on smaller plots in Suhum-Ayensuano cannot be 
attributed to more efficient use of inputs, since farmers 
at Suhum-Ayensuano largely produced cocoa without 
any significant usage of inputs, or an increased use of 
inputs over farmers at Juaboso. Therefore, this can 
only be attributed to more intensive use of labour in 
Suhum-Ayensuano, less incidence of disease – or less 
vulnerability of selected cocoa varieties to disease – or 
the natural conditions of the soil.
Quantitative data collected on the use of hybrids and 
yields did not show any correlation between the use 
of hybrid seed and increased productivity. In fact, the 
data showed the reverse: that most farms planted with 
hybrids gained lower average yields than those using 
Amelonado- or Amazonia-derived seeds (see Table 
6.4). This is not necessarily surprising, given the low 
usage of fertilisers on hybrids (which are heavy feeders 
on nutrient); the vulnerability of hybrids to disease; and 
the fact that farmers have selected their own varieties 
to perform more robustly under conditions where 
fertilisers and agrochemicals are not being used.
The rise of a class of a significant stratum of medium-
scale commercial farmers or of innovatory smallholders 
using hybrid seeds and inputs and achieving significantly 
higher yields has not materialised in Suhum-Ayensuano 
and Juaboso. There has been a very low uptake of new 
technologies. Most farmers struggle to meet increased 
labour and input requirements, and often expend 
most of their resources on hiring labour before they 
can address input investments. While women tend 
to use lower quantities of inputs than men, the vast 
majority of farmers are unable or unwilling to widely 
use inputs or implement the official recommendations. 
The high incidence of disease on cocoa plantations 
often result in farmers allocating any surplus capital 
to agrochemicals rather than fertilisers, and fertilisers 
appear to be largely used to address soil fertility issues 
rather than to attempt to enhance yields. Beyond the 
lack of availability of capital to purchase inputs, there is 
a lack of conviction among farmers that the solution to 
their problems is to adapt high-input packages. There 
are concerns about the lack of hardiness of hybrid 
varieties and their adaptability to existing farming 
system. There is some belief that the older varieties 
perform better within the existing farm agro-ecology.
6.2 Changes in the use of inputs 
Before the post-war period few farmers used inputs. 
The use of hybrid seeds, synthetic fertilisers and 
agrochemicals only became important in the post-war 
period following the emergence of major pest and disease 
problems in cocoa, particularly the swollen shoot virus. 
Table 6.3. The relationship between the size of cocoa plantations and yields per hectare in 
Suhum-Ayensuano and Juaboso










































0.1/1.99ha 74.4 14.6 11.0 100 70.8 15.0 14.2 100 82.4 13.7 3.9 100
2/4.99ha 80.5 12.6 6.9 100 65.3 21.4 13.3 100 91.7 6.0 2.3 100
5/8.99ha 86.7 13.3 0.0 100 66.7 33.3 0.0 100 91.7 8.3 0.0 100
9/65ha 100.0 0.0 0.0 100 100.0 0.0 0.0 100 100.0 0.0 0.0 100
Total 80.3 12.8 6.9 100 68.4 18.9 12.7 100 90.6 7.6 1.9 100
Pearson 
chi2(6) 
16.3278   Pr = 0.012 6.1584   Pr = 0.406  7.9846   Pr = 0.239
Source: Authors’ own
Table 6.4. Comparison of yields of planted hybrid and non-hybrid cocoa  
Cocoa yield (kg/ha) No hybrid (%) Planted hybrids (%) Total (%)
Less than 400kg/ha 72.2 83.7 80.3
401-800kg/ha 16.0 11.5 12.8
over 800kg/ha 11.8 4.9 6.9
Total 144 349 493
Pearson chi2 (2) = 10.3935   Pr = 0.006
Source: Authors’ own
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The cocoa swollen shoot virus was identified in 1936 
in the Eastern Region. Between 1936 and 1938, the 
Colonial Department of Agriculture destroyed 81,000 
trees in a drastic intervention to contain the disease. 
A Central Cocoa Research Station was established at 
Tafo to conduct research on the disease. Following the 
Second World War a major initiative was introduced to 
contain swollen shoot, which had now extended over 
an area of about 51,800km2 in the Eastern Province 
(now Eastern Region) and into Ashanti (Danquah, 
2003). As a result of the disease, the output of cocoa 
dropped from 300,000t in 1936 to 200,000t in the 
mid-1940s (Danquah, 2003). By 1947, it was estimated 
that 46 million trees were infected, of which 45 million 
were in the Eastern Province (Danquah, 2003). By 
1955, the Department of Agriculture had destroyed 
over 40 million cocoa trees on over 92,000 farms. 
Researchers advocated the replanting of the existing 
Amolenado tree stock with Amazonian F2 hybrids 
imported from Brazil, which were first introduced to 
farmers in 1963. Swollen shoot was also attributed 
to an ecological complex of interactions between the 
virus, mealybugs, Pseudococcus insects, ants and 
forest canopy shade trees preserved by farmers, 
such as Cola chlamydantha, Cola gigantea, and 
Ceiba pentandra (Collingwood, 1971). The solutions to 
these problems have involved the selection of hybrid 
varieties that favour drier conditions than Amolenado 
varieties, extension recommendations to limit numbers 
of shade trees on farms, and increasing the use of 
agrochemicals and fertilisers. However, these have 
not really solved the problem in the long-term. Swollen 
shoot virus continues to be problematic and a number 
of other diseases and pests continue to trouble cocoa 
farmers including capsids and black pod disease.
The swollen shoot epidemic of the 1930s–1950s 
resulted in the decline of cocoa in the Eastern Region, 
with many large-scale cocoa farmers losing a large 
proportion of their capital due to the disease. While 
many of the large-scale farmers migrated to the 
Western Region, they were unable to rebuild the scale 
of plantations they possessed due to the increasing 
value of land and the acquisition of land by larger 
number of farmers compared to the earlier days of 
pioneer cocoa farming. As cocoa farming became 
established within the Gold Coast, chiefs were also 
more reluctant to sell land outright and released more 
land on sharecropping contracts to migrant farmers 
(Boni, 2005). The increasing vulnerability of cocoa to 
disease and the replacement of the old varieties with 
modern hybrids has resulted in much higher costs 
in establishing farms that has also limited the size of 
farms and created increasing barriers to entry.  Many 
of the smaller farmers in the Eastern Region became 
increasingly impoverished and migrated to the Western 
Region as labourers, or in search of sharecrop 
tenancies (Arhin, 1988). Higher costs of farming and 
lower returns have created increasing barriers of entry 
for women and youth and resulted in farmers in many 
areas moving into food crop farming. 
In addition, the rising costs of inputs have not been 
reflected in the prices paid to farmers. Consequently, 
farmers find it difficult or not profitable to follow the 
recommendations. Thus, the overall trend has been 
towards smaller cocoa farms, but not more productive 
farms, since the smallholders often struggle to invest 
in inputs.  In the early 1970s, Collingwood (1971, p. 
289) commented:
As a tenfold increase in yield is possible under 
plantation conditions given capital adequate to 
support machinery and chemicals, the future 
seems to lie in big farming. But against this, 
fluctuations in market price are so wide as to 
deter the investor even where national land 
policy or unstable regimes do not debar him. 
We are left, therefore, with no choice but to 
support the present small farms and to continue 
recommending this of that formulation to farm 
labourers who cannot read what’s on the tin.  
Several studies continue to point out that la.rge 
numbers of farmers cannot afford the recommended 
pest and disease control and farm management 
practices. Rates of technology adoption are therefore 
low and pests and diseases a major constraint (Ollennu, 
Owusu, and Thresh, 1989; Padi and Owusu, 1998). 
Moreover, ‘the recommended methods for control of 
capsids and black pod disease which involve mainly 
the use of conventional insecticides and fungicides 
are now considered to be environmentally unfriendly, 
posing a threat to both humans and non-target 
beneficial organisms’ (Padi and Owusu, 1998, p. 10).
Several researchers have also expressed misgivings 
about the performance of hybrids under farming 
conditions. For instance, Gyau et al. (2015) state:
The dominant full-sun, mono-cropped cocoa 
system in Côte d’Ivoire which increase yields 
in the short-term led to severe long-term 
depletion of soil nutrients. Cocoa grown in 
this way requires rotation to new land after a 
period of 20-30 years and as a result caused 
deforestation. 
Gockowski and Sonwa (2011, p. 308) also note that 
farmers who have adopted hybrids have removed 
shade trees from cocoa, but have been unable to 
implement the recommended application of inputs and 
that this leads to environmental stress:
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Of the three main elements of the technology 
package (improved seed, fertilizer, and low 
shade) it is often only the elimination of shade 
that is practiced by resource-poor farmers who 
are either unable to afford, or lack ready access 
to the fertilizers and hybrid seed germplasm that 
are the key factors in the long term sustainability 
and productivity of this system.
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Since the late 1930s, cocoa has come under 
the management of a state sector that has been 
responsible for the marketing of cocoa, regulations 
and technical interventions in production, which 
first emerged in the context of Swollen Shoot. The 
creation of a Cocoa Marketing Board in the colonial 
period resulted from conflicts between farmers and 
European cocoa purchasing companies that resulted 
in the organisation of a cocoa boycott in 1938. Cocoa 
production reached 581,000t in 1964 and declined 
to 160,000t in 1984 as a result of declining producer 
prices paid by the Cocoa Marketing Board, and 
declining international prices. Since the early 1980s, 
there has been significant reforms of the state cocoa 
sector and pricing structures. While the government 
has resisted pressures to privatise state control over 
the international marketing of cocoa, it has liberalised 
the internal cocoa trade to licensed buyers. The 
government has retained a central role in setting the 
price for cocoa but has committed to increasing the 
percentage of export prices that farmers receive. It also 
retains a significant role in distributing and subsidising 
inputs to farmers, particularly in the area of mass 
spraying of cocoa and support for rehabilitation of 
cocoa farms with new hybrid varieties. The high quality 
of Ghanaian production has resulted in premium prices 
for Ghanaian cocoa and a favourable image for Ghana 
Cocoa Board (COCOBOD).. Ghanaian cocoa attracts 
a 3-5 per cent premium price over Côte d’Ivoire Cocoa 
(Kolavalli and Vigneri, 2017).
COCOBOD uses its control over international cocoa 
marketing to raise collateral loans to finance its 
management of cocoa, which has also affected its 
ability to provide support services to farmers. By 
2000, the Ghana producer price had increased by 
50 per cent and production to 400,000t, which was 
also encouraged by more favourable international 
prices for cocoa in the 2000s. Production expanded 
to over 950,000t in the mid 2010s but has since 
dropped following the significant fall in international 
prices for cocoa, which dropped by 40 per cent in 
2017 (World Bank, 2018).  The decline of international 
prices has also affected the ability of COCOBOD to 
raise syndicated loans on international markets and to 
provide subsidised inputs to farmers. The Ghanaian 
government has attempted to maintain high producer 
prices in a bid to maintain current production levels 
and has made calls for international producers to raise 
prices. This has resulted in a debate about the nature of 
appropriation of value within the commodity chain and 
the need for better prices for cocoa on the one hand 
(Fountain and Hietz-Adams, 2015; Odijie, 2018), and 
on excessive political intervention by government and 
its failure to adjust local prices to reflect international 
market fluctuations and on the need to educate 
farmers on the nature of international price fluctuations 
on the other hand (World Bank, 2018; Kolavalli and 
Vigneri, 2017).
Government continues to dominate the international 
sale of cocoa and provide services to farmers, but 
the governance of the cocoa sector essentially 
consists of a public-private partnership. Since the 
1990s, there have been substantial changes in the 
international cocoa sector with three corporations 
controlling over 60 per cent of global processing (Fold, 
2002; Terazono, 2014). These three corporations 
(Cargill, Barré Callebaut and Olam, which recently 
bought out `Archer Daniel Midland’s global cocoa 
supply chain) have all established grinding facilities in 
Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and internationally in Western 
ports, such as Amsterdam. These corporations have 
considerable influence over policy in Ghana, running 
their own individual cocoa programmes, such as 
Cargill’s Cocoa Promise and Nestlé’s Cocoa Plan. 
They have also established umbrella platforms, such 
as the World Cocoa Foundation, which are highly 
influential in shaping policies. These transnational 
corporations have played a powerful role in creating 
strategic alliances and networks of private service 
providers in fields of input distribution and financial 
service providers. This has resulted in the movement 
of large international corporations into both provision 
of credit services and input supplies. For instance, 
in credit services for farmers, international micro-
credit organisations such as Advans and Opportunity 
International Savings and Loans are now working 
within the cocoa sector (Amanor, 2021). Similarly in 
the supply of inputs, RMG Concept, a subsidiary 
of Syngenta, has acquired significant agrochemical 
marketing companies within Ghana (Amanor, 2021). 
Thus, the government’s control over cocoa marketing 
does not exclude private corporations and transnational 
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corporations. Government regulation of cocoa secures 
the market for international corporations by making 
it illegal for farmers or unlicensed buyers to trade in 
cocoa, thus preventing a local market and cottage 
artisanal sector to develop in cocoa processing, as 
occurs in other sectors, such as palm oil and shea 
butter processing, which frequently provide important 
sources of livelihood for rural women.
Powerful buyer-driven chains that impose powerful 
international morally-driven demands on the sector 
that shape policies through threats of sanctions 
also influence the cocoa sector. During the 1990s, 
concerns about child-labour were powerful in shaping 
regulations of cocoa and bringing together government 
and transnational corporations to work out new 
modes of governance. In recent years environmental 
discourses about cocoa’s impact on deforestation are 
shaping interventions within the cocoa sector, leading 
to the introduction of monitoring and tracking systems 
that trace production back to farms.
The gains in cocoa production of the 1990s and 
2000s have largely resulted from pricing reforms 
and government subsidisation of inputs, which 
have encouraged more farmers to rehabilitate old 
plantations and expand acreages under cocoa. These 
output gains have probably now met their limits, and 
the main policy initiatives now attempt to address 
productivity issues through encouraging the uptake 
of technical recommendations by farmers.  However, 
the sharp decline in international cocoa prices makes it 
increasingly difficult for the government to continue to 
provide subsidised inputs to farmers.
One policy response to these problems has been to 
call for increasing privatisation of government cocoa 
services to private market operators (Kolavalli and 
Vigneri, 2017; World Bank, 2018). However, this 
overlooks the fact that most cocoa services are provided 
by the private sector and government subsidies are 
essentially to private sector distributors. Government 
subsidised programmes have accompanied a large 
expansion of private networks of input distributors 
and linkages between farmer associations the private 
sector, and initiatives by transnational corporations 
with government support to implement a network of 
community-based input and hybrid seed distribution 
(Amanor, 2021). Odijie (2018) argues that government 
subsidies of cocoa inputs and seedlings have absorbed 
most of the surpluse government gains through 
the marketing of cocoa. In effect, the government is 
subsidising cocoa for the benefits of international cocoa 
corporation, instead of looking for viable alternatives 
to cocoa (Odijie, 2018). Cocoa provides about 10 
per cent of the value of agricultural production but 
accounts for 25 per cent of Ghana’s exports (World 
Bank, 2018).  Outside of cocoa there are few significant 
export crops, despite the government’s attempts to 
encourage non-traditional exports and diversification 
into a range of fruit crops (Teye and Torvikey, 2018). 
A disproportionate share of the agricultural budget 
is devoted to cocoa. Between 2006 and 2011, the 
share of public research funding allocated to cocoa 
was three times greater than the sector’s contribution 
to agricultural output (World Bank, 2018, p. 29). The 
state’s control over cocoa marketing and the lack of 
access to farmers to freely trade in cocoa products 
and beans also prevents local processing of cocoa 
and innovative local cocoa markets to emerge. This 
severely limits value processing to a select brand of 
elite small corporations that are unable to effectively 
compete in global markets dominated by transnational 
corporations. The World Bank (2018, p. 6) comments 
on the ’need to add more value to cocoa to reduce 
being price takers on the international market’.
The present subsidies and controls within the cocoa 
sector and lack of development of other agricultural 
alternatives ensures that large numbers of farmers 
remain within the cocoa sector rather than look for 
more profitable alternatives. Without addressing the 
technical problems within cocoa and the inequitable 
distribution of value, privatisation of cocoa support 
services may further shift the burden onto farmers, 
resulting in increasing farm debt as farmers resort to 
micro-credit service providers to continue to produce 
cocoa and deal with diseases and pests.
Beyond marketing solutions, other emerging policies 
deal with technical problems of production within the 
context of deforestation and climate change initiatives. 
This has arisen in the context of the association of 
cocoa with deforestation and international pressures 
on cocoa corporations. Many of the large transnational 
cocoa corporations have committed their supply 
chains to ensure against deforestation. Following the 
2017 UN Climate Change and Parties Conference, 
the governments of Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire together 
with transnational cocoa companies established the 
Cocoa and Forest Initiative, which commits the parties 
to prevent any further conversion of forests to cocoa. 
To prevent the expansion of cocoa farms they have 
committed to promoting sustainable intensification. 
They work in partnership with the Forestry Commission 
to introduce a tracing system from farm to market 
for supply chain monitoring, and sustainable cocoa 
production through promoting cocoa agroforests 
rather than full-sun based monocultures. They also 
promote tree planting of shade trees that have 
economic significance and can provide farmers with 
an income. However, they continue to work within a 
framework of intensification of input use, rather than 
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promoting a more diversified agroecosystem that can 
reduce reliance on agrochemicals and dependence on 
monocultures (Schroth and Harvey, 2007; Gockowski 
and Sonwa, 2011; Nasser et al., 2020). This focuses on 
intensifying production and preserving trees without 
addressing the profound issues of diseases and 
pests that result in increasing use of agrochemicals 
that have negative impacts on the forest fauna and 
farmers capital (Clough, Faust and Tscharntke, 2009; 
Asigbaase et al., 2019).
The shade trees that are promoted originate in seedlings 
raised by the forestry services rather than on farmers’ 
own selection of useful forest products based on their 
long history of interaction with forest. In the past, trees 
with significant commercial value or potential have been 
incorporated into cocoa plantations including Kola and 
Allanblackia (Amanor, 1996; Dawoe et al., 2016). Kola 
was an important export commodity in the nineteenth 
century and during the colonial period, but in recent 
years has been given low priority in agricultural policy. 
The potential of creating diverse orchard crops within 
these agroforests to minimise disease problems and 
hedge against price fluctuations has not received 
much attention.
These cocoa agroforest options are being developed 
and coordinated with the Forestry Commission. 
However, since the 1990s when the Forestry 
Commission implemented a new forest policy, the 
Forestry Commission has been associated with 
dispossessing farmers of tenure rights to forest trees. 
Before 1994, farmers had rights to timber trees on their 
farms and the norms allowed them to convert these 
trees to timber and transact trees with wood cutters 
and chainsaw operators. During the 1990s, the new 
Forest Policy brought on farm timber resources under 
the control of the Forestry Commission, criminalised 
farmers sale of farm timber and granted rights to 
timber concessionaires to exploit timber in farms and 
cocoa plantations. On-farm timber tenure has been 
redefined by the state, as vested in chiefs who have 
rights to royalties and held in trust by the state, which 
has the right to allocate them to concessionaires. 
This resulted in the rapid offtake of timber in farming 
areas during the 1990s, which contributed about 
80 per cent of timber exports (Amanor, 1999). As a 
result of damage rendered to cocoa plantations by 
timber concessionaires, farmers became reluctant 
to preserve timber trees within their farms, leading to 
the rapid reduction of shade trees on farms (Amanor, 
2005; Marfo et al., 2012; Dawoe et al., 2016; Nasser et 
al., 2020). Present initiatives enable farmers to register 
areas in which they have planted trees, but do not give 
them rights to sell trees independently or to process 
them into timber. This tends to weaken farmers’ future 
bargaining position against timber companies in selling 
timber products, since they have no options to sell to 
markets other than timber contractors with monopoly 
rights.  The impact of these policies is also likely to add 
more pressures on smallholders, since farmers must 
now add the costs of managing trees to the already 
large expenditure on labour and agrochemicals, while 
the distant future returns to cultivating timber are not 
very clear. These do not solve the immediate needs 
of farmers for capital to meet existing costs of inputs, 
since timber tree cultivation is a long-term investment. 
The moral discourses on intensifying production to halt 
deforestation and expansion into new areas, and the 
needs to introduce surveillance over farm production 
also add to the pressures on smallholders. Those least 
likely to benefit from these arrangements include the 
large numbers of cocoa planters who acquire land on 
sharecrop arrangements (Nasser et al., 2020). 
The alliance between the forestry and cocoa sectors 
operates with the remit of controlling farmers into 
predefined project-determined policy directives 
rather than searching for new creative opportunities. 
These recent cocoa agroforest initiatives provide little 
scope for the considerable knowledge of farmers 
of agroforesty techniques and species diversity to 
be incorporated into conservation initiatives. The 
concerns with intensifying cocoa production also 
prevent the development of options that attempt to 
diversify production as a means of hedging against 
price fluctuations and vulnerability to disease and pest 
epidemics. They do not consider alternative frameworks 
to intensive monocultural cocoa hybrid plantations 
that can include more diverse agroforestry systems, 
incorporating a variety of fruit trees and indigenous 
forest species alongside cocoa (Gyau, 2015; Asigbaase 
et al., 2019).  More diversified agroforests can lay the 
basis for meeting the needs of many poorer farmers 
for less intensive input cocoa systems, which hedge 
against market shocks of fluctuating prices for cocoa, 
while genuinely addressing and ameliorating some of 
the environmental effects of expansive monocultural 
production and the high costs of agrochemicals.
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The cocoa sector in Ghana provides over 100 years 
of experience of commercial development. Over this 
period, cocoa has been transformed from a pioneer 
forest crop associated with the opening up of new 
forests and minimal use of inputs, to a crop associated 
with intensive cultivation and a high usage of inputs by 
smallholder farmers on rehabilitated old forest land. 
Replanting of cocoa has not been an easy venture and 
a common experience is for the frontier to shift to new 
areas and old frontiers to move into other crops. In 
Ghana, this has only been partially the case, and while 
new crops have been taken up in some areas of the 
forest, such as the new oil palm belt in the Kade area, 
many areas lack a viable alternative to cocoa. This is 
partly because of the government’s commitment to 
cocoa, its allocation of an inordinately large part of 
the agricultural budget to cocoa, and its development 
of a large state sector committed to marketing of 
cocoa. While this resulted in some successes in 
turning around the cocoa sector, and raising outputs 
to an all-time high, the cocoa sector continues to be 
highly vulnerable to market fluctuations, as reflected 
in the recent sharp falls in prices. These threaten the 
ability of government to continue to provide support to 
farmers in input subsidies and packages for replanting. 
Cocoa continues to be plagued by high incidences of 
diseases that drastically affect yield and force farmers 
to expend considerable resources on agrochemicals. 
As a result, large numbers of farmers are often unable 
to follow extension recommendations, and the outlays 
on inputs and labour are not reflected in the prices that 
farmers receive. Due to these constraints, a medium 
strata of farmers investing in inputs and experiencing 
significantly improved yields has failed to materialise in 
a significant way, and the cocoa sector is dominated 
by large numbers of smallholders struggling to acquire 
inputs and hire labour. Entry barriers are high, resulting 
in the emergence of sharecropping among farmers 
who cannot afford land or gain access to land and 
among farmers with land who cannot afford the costs 
of rehabilitating plantations. Farmers with larger areas 
of land often cannot afford the costs of hired labour 
and inputs, and often gain lower yields than farmers 
with smaller holdings. The wealthy cocoa farmers 
with multiple large holdings in several settlements are 
no longer common in cocoa as they were up until the 
1960s, and many of the wealthy cocoa farmers from 
the colonial period have moved into other sectors. A 
significant number of descendants of cocoa farmers 
have moved into the informal artisanal and trading 
sectors in the many small towns within the cocoa 
belt, including a large proportion of women who 
experience difficulties in entering cocoa production. 
Since the state monopolises trading in cocoa for 
the export sector, there are no opportunities for 
rural processing of cocoa products to emerge. 
Many youths work as casual labourers since they 
have limited options of gaining land and capital to 
invest in cocoa, and because the labour-intensive 
activities of replanting cocoa result in high demand 
for hired labour. Recently, environmental objectives 
have been added to cocoa projects. These largely 
respond to international narratives of deforestation 
and Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (REDD+) 
initiatives. These are appended onto the frameworks 
of agricultural intensification, in which intensification 
solves deforestation by halting the need of farmers 
to move into forested land and forest reserves to 
maintain their output. This adds the planting of shade 
trees to intensified cocoa production as a potential 
REDD+ friendly activity. However, this fails to address 
or resolve the ecological crisis of the vulnerability of 
cocoa monocultures to disease and pests that lies at 
the heart of cocoa production, and which originally 
initiated the rise of agricultural modernisation in cocoa 
in the 1940s. It also fails to develop a more inclusive 
approach to cocoa that builds upon the knowledge 
and experience of farming communities of forests and 
local markets in forest products.
8 CONCLUSION
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